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A vast literature has investigated the relationship between trust and aggregate economic performance.
We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We
find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs available in the
European Social Survey. We show that heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population, coupled with
the tendency of individuals to extrapolate beliefs about others from their own level of trustworthiness,
could generate the non-monotonic relationship between trust and income. Highly trustworthy individuals
think others are like them and tend to form beliefs that are too optimistic, causing them to assume
too much social risk, to be cheated more often and ultimately perform less well than those who happen
to have a trustworthiness level close to the mean of the population. On the other hand, the low-trustworthiness
types form beliefs that are too conservative and thereby avoid being cheated, but give up profitable
opportunities too often and, consequently, underperform. Our estimates imply that the cost of either
excessive or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by foregoing college. Furthermore, we
find that people who trust more are cheated more often by banks as well as when purchasing goods
second hand, when relying on the services of a plumber or a mechanic and when buying food. We
complement the survey evidence with experimental evidence showing that own trustworthiness and
expectations of others' trustworthiness in a trust game are strongly correlated and that performance
in the game is hump-shaped.
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More than 35 years ago Kenneth Arrow (1972), after recognizing the pervasiveness of mu-
tual trust in commercial and non-commercial transactions, went so far as to state that
"it can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be
explained by the lack of mutual con￿dence" (p. 357). Since then, Arrow￿ s conjecture has
received considerable empirical support. A vast literature has investigated the link between
a community￿ s average trust and its aggregate economic performance, ￿nding a positive and
monotonic relationship.1 No research, however, is available on the relationship between an
individual￿ s level of trust￿ the belief a person has about the trustworthiness of the people
he or she deals with￿ and his or her economic performance. The latter relationship is the
focus of this paper.
What makes this inquiry interesting is the great heterogeneity in trust beliefs across in-
dividuals. Figure 1 shows the distribution of trust beliefs for each of the countries surveyed
in the European Social Survey. Trust is measured on a scale between 0 and 10, where zero
means no trust at all and 10 means that other people can be fully trusted.2 Obviously, for
each country, respondents cannot all be simultaneously right: since each of them faces the
same population, some must have beliefs that are too conservative about the trustworthi-
ness of the population, while others must have beliefs that are too optimistic. Individuals
at the tails of the distribution of trust beliefs must, respectively, underestimate and overes-
timate the trustworthiness of others and this should be re￿ ected in an individual￿ s economic
performance: those who trust too little will give up trade and pro￿t opportunities too of-
ten, depressing their economic performance; on the other hand, individuals who trust too
much will over-invest in others and get cheated more frequently, hampering their economic
outcomes. Hence, at the individual level, the relationship between trust and economic per-
formance is non-monotonic. There exists an intermediate level of trust￿ the "right amount
of trust"￿ that maximizes an individual￿ s income. This amount of income, and trust, will
1Trust has been shown to be strongly correlated with GDP per capita and its level (Knack and Zak
(1999); Knack and Keefer (1996)); with the ability of ￿rms to grow larger (La Porta et. al. (1997)); with the
size of a country￿ s stock market (Guiso et. al. (2008a)); and with the incentives to trade across countries as
well as cross-country trading patterns (Guiso et al., 2009)). Though some of this evidence may be viewed
skeptically and suspected of reverse causality￿ richer societies can be more conducive to trust, for example
by creating better institutions￿ recent research has started to address this reverse causality issue (Guiso et
al (2004); Algan and Cahuc (2008); Tabellini (2008b)).
2See Section 4 for the exact wording of the question asked to measure trust.
2be attained by individuals whose beliefs are closest to the average trustworthiness in the
population.
We test the relationship between trust and income using data from the European So-
cial Survey. This survey is particularly useful because individuals are asked to state the
intensity of their trust beliefs on a scale between 0 and 10, rather than simply whether they
believe that most people can be trusted or not (as in most surveys that ask trust questions).
It is this feature that enables us to explore the relationship between individuals￿levels of
trust and performance￿ particularly at the tails of the distribution of trust beliefs.
When we regress individuals￿income on a set of dummies for the 11 di⁄erent levels
of trust we ￿nd a marked hump-shaped relationship: people with low levels of trust have
signi￿cantly lower income than those with intermediate levels of trust. Income tends to
reach a peak at a level of trust around 8, before declining rapidly for the highest levels of
trust.
The magnitudes are economically signi￿cant as well. On average, individuals with the
lowest level of trust have an income that is 14.5% lower than the income of those with the
right amount of trust, which is a decline in income on par with the income lost by foregoing
college. Those with the highest level of trust have an income that falls short of the peak by
7%. Thus, the cost of deviating from the right amount of trust can be substantial.
One may argue that low levels of income in conjunction with low levels of trust may
be caused by adverse experiences, which lower income and result in a loss of con￿dence.
However, this reverse causality cannot explain why income falls at very high levels of trust.
To strengthen the causal interpretation we re-estimate the relationship between individual
income and trust beliefs in low and high trust countries. In countries with low average
trustworthiness the right amount of trust is clearly lower than in countries with high average
trustworthiness. Hence, the income-trust relationship should, ceteris paribus, peak at lower
levels of individual trust in the ￿rst group of countries and at a higher level in the second.
Consistent with this implication we ￿nd that the income-trust relationship is always hump-
shaped, but in low trust countries peaks at a lower trust level. We also show that the
hump-shaped income-trust relationship is not a re￿ ection of obvious forms of unobserved
heterogeneity. For example, we can rule out the explanation that moderate levels of trust
are actually serving as a generic measure of moderate traits, which are better suited to
achieve economic success than extreme traits. Furthermore, we show that the hump-shaped
3income-trust relationship does not vanish with experience, nor with education.
The European Social Survey allows us to dig deeper into one of the mechanisms that
leads trust judgments to a⁄ect economic performance: exposure to the risk of being cheated.
The ESS asks individuals whether, over the past ￿ve years, they have been "cheated" over
a list of four domains: dealing with a bank, buying goods second hand, buying food, and
dealing with a plumber, builder, mechanic or repairman. Ceteris paribus, individuals who
are exceedingly trusting should be cheated more often. Clearly, individuals who are cheated
learn and revise their trust beliefs downward. Thus, learning tends to generate a negative
correlation between trust and the experience of being cheated. To isolate the causal e⁄ect
of trust on the probability of being cheated we adopt an instrumental variables approach.
When we use OLS regressions we ￿nd that the negative correlation predicted by learning
dominates. But when we purge this e⁄ect by using IV estimates we ￿nd that those who
trust more are indeed more likely to be cheated across all the domains for which we have
data.
To inquire further into the link between trust and being cheated we use detailed in-
formation on immigrants provided by the European Social Survey. One strand of literature
has shown that cultural norms such as individual trustworthiness and attitudes concern-
ing trusting others are acquired through intergenerational transmission (Giuliano (2007);
Fernandez and Fogli (2009); Guiso et. al. (2004, 2008b), Tabellini (2008a, 2008b), Dohmen
et. al. (2007)) and thus tend to persist across generations. This provides an alternative
source of exogenous variation which can be used to identify the causal e⁄ect of trust on ex-
posure to social risk. Under the hypothesis that trust beliefs persist, or that cultural norms
are slow to change and that individuals extrapolate from their own beliefs, immigrants from
high trust countries should be, all else equal, more likely to be cheated. But this e⁄ect could
fade away as individuals accumulate evidence and revise their priors. Consistent with this
prediction, we ￿nd that immigrants from relatively high trust countries are, ceteris paribus
cheated more often. However, we ￿nd that the correlation is in large part due to a strong
positive e⁄ect of average trust levels in the country of origin on ￿rst generation immigrants;
the second generation learns from experience and, consequently, high trust levels in the
country of origin cease to have a signi￿cant impact on immigrants￿exposure to fraud.
To provide more controlled evidence on the humped-shaped relationship between trust
and economic performance and on the heterogeneous nature of trust beliefs we report evid-
4ence drawn from a multiple-round experiment. We show that own trustworthiness and
expectations of others￿trustworthiness in the trust game are strongly correlated and that
the correlation does not vanish when the trust game is repeated several times. In addition,
we ￿nd that participants￿trustworthiness, as measured by their behavior in the trust game,
can be traced back to the values that their parents instilled. Finally, even in this controlled
context individuals that depart from the right amount of trust earn less, and the shortfall
in earnings is of the same order of magnitude as observed in the survey data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss alternative
explanations for why trust beliefs may di⁄er and persist. In Section 3 we present a simple
model that predicts a hump-shaped relationship between individual trust and performance.
In Section 4 we describe the data and in Section 5 we present the results of our trust-
performance relationship estimations. In Sections 6 we show the estimates of the e⁄ect of
trust on the frequency with which one is cheated. In Section 7 we present the experimental
evidence from the trust game. Section 8 concludes.
2 Why are trust beliefs heterogeneous?
Where does the heterogeneity in trust beliefs documented in Figure 1 come from? There are
two plausible explanations why trust can di⁄er across individuals in the same community
and why these di⁄erences may persist. According to one view, beliefs are acquired through
cultural transmission and then slowly updated through experience from one generation to
another. Heterogeneity is then the result of family-speci￿c shocks. This line of argument has
been pursued by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008b) who build an overlapping-generations
model in which children absorb their trust priors from their parents and then, after experi-
encing the real world, transmit them (updated) to their own children. Dohmen et. al (2007)
provide evidence consistent with this view. They show that in a panel of German house-
holds, sons￿and daughters￿trust beliefs are strongly positively correlated with those of their
parents, particularly those of the mother￿ as would be expected if these priors are instilled
early in life and mothers play a greater role in children￿ s early education. This explains
heterogeneity in initial priors and persistence across generations; for any generation, the
correlation between current beliefs and received priors dilutes as people age and learn. Yet
trust beliefs may persist also within the same generation if people are reluctant to dismiss
their cultural priors even in the face of evidence. One mechanism generating persistence
5could be con￿rmation bias￿ a tendency to seek and ￿nd con￿rmatory evidence in support of
already existing beliefs and ignore or reinterpret discon￿rmatory evidence.3 Alternatively,
cultural beliefs may persist because, once hardwired, they are painful to eradicate and this
pain makes one resistant to update even when discon￿rming information is made available.4
The second plausible explanation is that parents teach their children values rather than
beliefs. In particular, they may teach values of trustworthiness￿ how much to stick to a
promise once it has been made even at the cost of material gains. Cultural transmission
of values of cooperation and trustworthiness is the focus of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001),
Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004) and Tabellini (2008a) who show that instilled norms of
behavior are passed down from parents, who optimally choose them, to kids; and that these
norms tend to persist from generation to generation. Heterogeneity in parents preferences
and experiences may then result in heterogeneity in instilled trustworthiness. Even if parents
do not teach priors, individuals who lack information may extrapolate from their own types
when forming beliefs about the trustworthiness of others. As Thomas Schelling once wrote
￿ ... you can sit in your armchair and try to predict how people behave by asking yourself
how you would behave if you had your wits about you. You get free of charge a lot of
vicarious empirical behavior.￿More succinctly, Schelling supported the idea that putting
yourself in others￿shoes is useful for predicting the behavior of others.
When applied to our context, this false consensus e⁄ect (Ross, Green and House (1977))
implies that highly trustworthy individuals will tend to think that others are like them and,
hence, form trust beliefs that are too optimistic; highly untrustworthy people will similarly
extrapolate from their own type and tend to form excessively pessimistic beliefs.
Thus, with false consensus, heterogeneity in values (own trustworthiness) translates
into heterogeneity in beliefs (trust). If values persist over time and false consensus does
not vanish with learning, then wrong beliefs will also persist.5 Learning may attenuate the
3A recent functional magnetic resonance imaging study shows where in the brain the con￿rmation bias
arises and how it operates unconsciously (Westen, et. al., 2006).
4Blanco (2008) provides evidence consistent with this view in the context of a trust game experiment. She
shows that a behavioural measure of trust￿ the amount sent by a sender￿ continues to be correlated with
the trustworthiness of the sender (the amounts he returns when he plays as a receiver) even when controlling
for the amounts that the receiver plans to return, and even when the receiver￿ s plan is fully revealed to the
sender before she makes her decision. In other words, actual trust decisions seem to respond to own values
even when the behaviour of the counterpart is fully known.
5False consensus has been shown to be a persistent phenomenon: neither providing additional information
about the population of interest, nor warning individuals about the possibility of false conseunsus, eliminates
the e⁄ect (Krueger and Clement (1994)). Furthermore, it has been found that FC is not drowned out by
monetary incentives for accurate predictions (e.g. Massey and Thaler (2006)).
6relevance of initial norms, but through false consensus the highly trustworthy and highly
untrustworthy will tend to systematically form more extreme trust beliefs.
In the next section we present a simple static model illustrating how heterogeneous trust
beliefs, possibly because individuals form beliefs by extrapolating from their own type, can
imply that economic performance follows a hump-shaped pro￿le in trust.
3 Individual trust and economic performance: a simple model
Consider an investor with an endowment E which can be invested, totally or partially,
in a venture managed by a partner who can be thought of as an entrepreneur. If an
amount S ￿ E is invested, this produces a surplus according to the transformation function
f(S) > S: Once the surplus f(S) is realized, the entrepreneur returns a fraction 0 < ￿ < 1
of it to the investor and keeps the rest for himself. Entrepreneurs, however, are of two
types: honest and cheaters. A fraction ￿ of entrepreneurs are cheaters, while the rest
of the economy￿ s entrepreneurs are honest. Each investor is randomly matched with an
entrepreneur, as in Dixit (2003). An honest entrepreneur returns the promised share of the
surplus, ￿f(S), while a cheater absconds with the whole surplus. We assume that f(S) is
increasing and concave, so that f0(0) > 0 and f00(0) < 0, and is such that ￿f(S) > S, so that
the investment has a positive return if the entrepreneur does not cheat. We also assume that
(1￿￿)￿f0(0) > 1. This last condition implies that at zero investment the expected marginal
return from investing exceeds the return from keeping the money under the mattress. These
assumptions, taken together, imply a unique, internal, optimal investment amount.
For their part, investors di⁄er in trustworthiness as well. Assume there is a continuum
of investors each characterized by a certain level of trustworthiness, p, distributed on the
unit interval [0;1]. Next, similar to entrepreneurs, suppose that a fraction ￿ of investors
has a level of trustworthiness p ￿ ￿: Of course, while an investor can be cheated, investors
cannot cheat. We ￿rst assume that investors have correct beliefs and anticipate that the
probability of being cheated is ￿: Given these correct beliefs, an individual investor decides
how much to invest in the venture so as to maximize:
MaxS : Y (S) = E ￿ S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f(S) (1)
s:t: : S ￿ E (2)
Let S￿
￿ denote the optimal amount invested when beliefs are correct. Then the average
7income that the investor obtains will be Y (S￿
￿) = E ￿ S￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f(S￿
￿).
Consider next the case where investors form beliefs about the trustworthiness of entre-
preneurs by extrapolating from their own types. To illustrate, suppose that the trust belief
of an individual with own-trustworthiness level p is exactly his or her own trustworthiness.
Given these (possibly incorrect) beliefs, an investor solves the problem:
MaxS : Y (S) = E ￿ S + (1 ￿ p)￿f(S) (3)
s:t: : S ￿ E (4)
Using similar notation as before, let S￿
p denote the optimal amount invested when be-
liefs about others￿trustworthiness are extrapolated from the investor￿ s own type and let
Y (S￿
p) = E ￿S￿
p +(1￿￿)￿f(S￿
p) be the investor￿ s average income. Notice that income real-
izations depend on the actual fraction of trustworthy entrepreneurs. We state the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: When individuals extrapolate from their own type,
an investor￿ s average income,Y (S￿
p); is a concave function of the investor￿ s trust
beliefs. This function attains its maximum when the investor￿ s belief about the
share of trustworthy entrepreneurs, 1 ￿ p, equals the true share of trustworthy
entrepreneurs (1 ￿ ￿). Proof: see the appendix.
The proposition implies that both investors with very low and very high levels of trust
(and trustworthiness) do worse than those with a trust (and trustworthiness) level close to
the average trustworthiness of the population. In the ￿rst case, by under-investing investors
with very low trust levels lose little if cheated; but by retaining too much of their endowment,
they give up pro￿t opportunities￿ and the latter e⁄ect far exceeds the former. Investors in
the second group invest a lot in the productive venture, which can potentially raise their
income. But since they grant entrepreneurs more trust than they deserve, they lose a lot
when cheated and the latter e⁄ect dominates the former. Hence, the relationship between
individual economic performance and trust beliefs is hump-shaped, as illustrated in Figure
2.
If countries di⁄er in their average degree of trustworthiness (1￿￿), then individual ob-
served performance, Y (S￿
p), will, ceteris paribus, be higher in high-trustworthiness countries.
8We will capture these shifts with a set of country dummies as well as ￿ner, community-level,
trustworthiness controls. Most importantly, the level of trust at which income attains its
maximum depends on the share of trustworthy people, (1￿￿), in the population: the larger
this share, the more the peak in income will be located to the right in Figure 2. Thus:
PROPOSITION 2: The performance-trust relationship will be increasing
over a wider range of (low) trust levels in societies where average trustworthiness
is high, compared to societies where the share of trustworthy people is low.
This is a relevant prediction that can be tested empirically.
There are two points to notice. In this simple model the channel through which trust
beliefs and individual performance are related is systematically wrong beliefs induced by
the tendency of each individual to extrapolate from his or her own type (or by ingrained
heterogeneous priors). Obviously, there could be other channels. For instance, high-trust
people may become targets of swindlers who can exploit na￿ve expectations of good faith.
Alternatively, highly trusting people may be more exposed to con￿dence games even when
their own attitude to trust is not explicitly targeted. Barnard Mado⁄￿ s story can be inter-
preted as one where high-trust individuals were more likely to fall into Mado⁄￿ s game even
if they were not individually targeted. These two mechanisms can obviously explain why
those who trust too much may lose. However, they cannot explain why those who trust too
little also may do poorly. Culture-induced heterogeneity in beliefs or in values, together
with the tendency of individuals to extrapolate from their own types, can explain both.
Second, the model implies that in the absence of false consensus all individuals would
share the same beliefs even if individuals are actually heterogeneous. False consensus,
by linking trust beliefs to own-trustworthiness, automatically gives rise to heterogeneity in
beliefs. In this context one interpretation of false consensus is to view it as a source of initial
priors, which allows for a departure from the controversial common prior assumption. In the
absence of a history of information about the reliability of a pool of people, those interacting
with an unknown pool form a prior by asking themselves how they would behave in similar
circumstances; since they would behave di⁄erently, they start with di⁄erent priors. This is
consistent with the evidence shown in Section 7.
94 Data: the European Social Survey
To study the relationship between individual performance and trust beliefs we rely on the
second wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2004/2005. The ESS is a
biennial cross-sectional survey administered in a large sample of mostly European Nations.
The survey has been conducted three times: in 2002/2003, 2004/2005 and 2006/2007. The
number of countries varies by wave (22 in the ￿rst, 26 in the second and 25 in the last
one). We use the second round because it is the only round containing the measures of
cheating which are crucial for our analysis. For each country, the ESS provides information
on individuals￿social values, cultural norms and behavior patterns. Within each country, a
representative sample of around 2,000 individuals is surveyed.6 Pooling observations across
countries yields about 49,000 observations. The data appendix provides details on the
sample selection, the countries included and the overall survey design. Besides containing
information on core variables of interest for the purpose of the survey, the ESS provides data
on a number of demographic characteristics of the respondents as well as various indicators
of respondents￿socioeconomic status.
4.1 Measuring trust
Crucially for our purpose, the ESS elicits trust beliefs by asking the classical question
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can￿ t be
too careful in dealing with people?" In contrast to all other comparable surveys where the
trust question is asked (e.g., the World Values Survey or the US General Social Survey), in
the ESS respondents are asked to express the intensity of their trust beliefs on a scale of 0
to 10, where 0 means no trust at all and 10 means that most people can be fully trusted.7 It
is precisely this unique feature of the ESS that allows us to test whether an individual-level
trust-performance relationship exists and whether it is hump-shaped.
Figure 1 illustrates both the presence of a considerable number of observations at the
two tails of the distribution of trust within each country, as well as systematic di⁄erences
in the shape of the trust distribution across countries. In one group￿ the high trust North
European countries such as Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands￿ the
6Sample size di⁄ers by country depending on country population and ranges from 579 in Iceland to 2870
in Germany.
7In other surveys, responses are binary￿ essentially yes or no responses signifying whether the respondent
believes people can be trusted in general.
10distribution has a fat tail on the right and the modal level of trust is quite high at around
7 or 8. In another group which includes the Mediterranean countries and several Eastern
European countries, the fat tail is to the left, denoting low average trust. In a third group
that includes several European countries such as Austria, Germany, France and the UK,
the distribution is more balanced with modal values between 5 and 6 and distributions
that are more symmetric. Table 1 shows that in the whole sample the mean trust level
is around 5, with a standard deviation of 2.5. As we show in Section 5, both within-
and between-country variation prove critical for identifying the predicted hump-shaped
relationship between performance and trust.8
4.2 Measuring performance
The ESS is rich in many dimensions, but as with most surveys focusing on values it has little
information on individuals￿economic outcomes or other economic variables. The best avail-
able performance indicator is a measure of total net household income, which is the measure
that we will use. Each respondent is asked to report which income category, identi￿ed with
a letter, best approximates his or her household￿ s total net income. This includes income
from all sources including labor income and income from capital and investments. This
is an important feature since income from capital may be more exposed to opportunistic
behavior than labor income and thus be more sensitive to correct trust beliefs. In order
to facilitate the answers, the question is framed in a way that accounts for country-speci￿c
conventions in the frequency of income payments. Respondents can provide the income ￿g-
ure using the frequency they know best: weekly, monthly or annual. Each letter identi￿es
an income bracket in euros (see the data appendix for more details) de￿ned so as to be
consistent across di⁄erent frequencies.9 We convert the answers to all be on a yearly basis.
The resulting brackets range from up to 1800 euros per year to above 120,000 (the largest
net income allowed). To facilitate our analysis we identify each bracket with its mid-point.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for (log) income in the sample.
8In the ￿nal sample used in our estimations, there are over 2,000 observations with trust equal to 9 or
10 and almost 4,000 with trust equal to either 1 or 0.
9For instance, the ￿rst income category identi￿es income below 40 euros per week or below 150 euros per
month or below 1800 euros per year. These ￿gures are equivalent if a month is made of four paid working
weeks and a year of 12 paid working months.
115 Estimating the performance-trust relationship
To study the relationship between individual economic performance and the level of indi-
vidual trust we estimate the following model:
log(Yic) = ￿j￿jTrustjic + ￿Xic + ￿C + ￿R + ￿ic (5)
where Yic is the income level of individual i in country c and Xic is a vector of individual
controls that can a⁄ect economic performance. We capture the e⁄ect of trust with a set of
10 dummies Trust1;Trust2, ....Trust10, with the excluded group being those who report a
trust level of 0￿ the lowest level of trust. This speci￿cation can characterize the shape of
the relationship in a very ￿ exible way without imposing parametric assumptions. Finally, to
control for systematic di⁄erences in average income across countries and, within countries,
across regions, we insert a vector of country ￿xed e⁄ects, C, and a vector of regional
￿xed e⁄ects, R. Among other things, these ￿xed e⁄ects capture di⁄erences in individual
performance due to systematic di⁄erences in the average level of trustworthiness across
countries and, within countries, across di⁄erent regions. The vector X includes dummies
for individuals￿educational attainment as well as dummies for respondents￿fathers￿levels
of education, which serve as proxies for acquired and inherited human capital, respectively.
The vector X also contains a linear and quadratic term in age to capture life cycle e⁄ects
in income, dummies for unemployment, gender, marital status and immigration status, as
well as dummies for city size with rural areas being the excluded category.
Table 2 shows the resulting estimates. We do not report country and regional ￿xed
e⁄ects, instead showing only the F-test for their joint signi￿cance in the note at the bottom
of the table. The ￿rst column reports estimates for the whole sample, using as the only
regressors the set of trust dummies as well as country and region ￿xed e⁄ects. The income-
trust relationship is increasing at low levels of trust. Income increases faster at low levels
of trust, before leveling o⁄ and peaking at a trust level of 7 and subsequently declining.
The decline is initially small, at the trust levels of 8 and 9. However, income falls rapidly
moving from a trust level of 9 to the highest level, 10. This pattern is fully consistent
with what the model in Section 3 predicts. It has, however, been obtained without any
controls for other possible determinants of income that are likely to be correlated with trust
12(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). In column 2 we add these controls. Most of the coe¢ cients
have e⁄ects consistent with our priors: income increases with own and father￿ s education;
it is hump-shaped in age; it is higher for males, married or single (compared to divorced
or widowers). Income is lower for the unemployed, for those out of the labor force and for
immigrants. Across the board, the e⁄ects of trust become smaller, signaling that trust was
partially serving as a proxy for individual attributes such as education. However, the shape
of the income-trust relationship is una⁄ected: it increases at low levels of trust, reaches a
peak at a trust level of 8 and then falls. This concave pattern is clearly shown in Figure 3.
Concerning the magnitude of the e⁄ect of trust beliefs on income, those with the lowest
level of trust have an income that is 14.5 percent lower than income at the peak; this
di⁄erence is of the same order of magnitude as the di⁄erence in income (15.7 per cent)
associated with obtaining a college degree. Those who express the highest level of trust
(10) make an income that is 7.3 percent lower than peak income. Both of these di⁄erences
are statistically signi￿cant, as the t-tests at the bottom of the table show. Thus, departing
from the right amount of trust, either because one trusts too much or because one trusts
too little can be individually very costly.
In our estimates we are interpreting measured trust as picking up only individual beliefs
about others￿trustworthiness. There is a still-unsettled debate over whether questions such
as those asked by the ESS or the World Values Survey re￿ ect expected trustworthiness only,
or re￿ ect a mix of beliefs and individual preferences (see Miller and Mitamura (2003)). For
instance, Fehr (2009) points out that answers to trust questions like those asked in the ESS
likely re￿ ect not only individuals￿beliefs about others￿trustworthiness, but also individuals￿
preferences towards risk, and in particular towards social risk.10 Alternatively, it has been
argued (Cox, 2004) that trust may re￿ ect pure altruistic preferences in addition to beliefs
about others￿trustworthiness, so that for given beliefs more altruistic individuals would
exhibit more trust. This would be the case, for example, when trust is measured as the act
of sending money in standard trust games, but could also be re￿ ected in survey measures
of trust if individuals respond by mimicking what they would do in an experiment. In
10Glaeser et. al. (2000) argue that WVS questions are better measures of trustworthiness than of trust
beliefs as they correlate poorly with amounts sent in a trust game. However, as Sapienza et. al (2007)
argue, this is due to behavioral trust measuring both beliefs and preferences. They conduct a systematic
study of this issue in the context of a trust game where subjects report expected trustworthiness and are
also asked the standard WVS generalized trust question. They ￿nd that a sender￿ s expectations of others
trustworthiness is highly correlated with the trust question in the WVS, suggesting that the latter is a good
measure of the belief component of trust.
13Section 7 we fully address these issues because the trust experiment allows us to separate
beliefs from preferences. Here, to account for these possibilities, in the third column we
add a control for risk preferences, and in the three subsequent columns we include also
three di⁄erent proxies for altruistic preferences. To obtain these measures, we rely on
questions concerning attitudes on various domains elicited by asking participants how a
certain description applies to them. They were asked the following question: "I will brie￿ y
describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person
is or is not like you."
To obtain an indicator of risk attitudes we use the following description: "She/he looks
for adventures and likes to take risks. She/he wants to have an exciting life." To obtain
indicators of altruistic preferences we rely on the following two descriptions: "It is important
to her/him to be loyal to her/his friends. She/he wants to devote herself/himself to people
close to her/him" (Altruism 1 in Table 1) and "She/he thinks it is important that every
person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal
opportunities in life" (Altruism 2 in Table 1). We also use an additional question asking
how much the respondent agrees with the statement : "Citizens should spend at least some
of their free time helping others" (Altruism 3 in Table 1)
For all questions besides the last, respondents provide answers between 1 and 6, with
1 meaning "very much like me," 6 meaning "Not like me at all" and values in between
re￿ ecting intermediate similarity. For the third question, the scale ranged from 1 to 5,
with 1 meaning "Strongly agree" and 5 meaning "Strongly disagree." Thus higher values
of the risk preference indicator signal high risk aversion and higher values of the altruistic
preferences measures mean less altruism. In all of the analysis that follows, we re-order
responses to these questions so that higher values indicate higher risk tolerance and more
altruism, respectively.
Risk tolerance is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with income while measures of
altruism are in general negatively correlated. However, when we control for these preference
measures, and thus net out the trust measure from their in￿ uence, our results are una⁄ected.
This suggests that the trust-performance relationship is not merely an artifact of trust
serving as a proxy for risk preferences or altruism.
Finally, in the last column we replace the set of trust dummies with a linear and quad-
ratic term in the trust variable. This parametric speci￿cation allows a direct test of concav-
14ity. Consistent with the previous evidence, the linear term is positive and signi￿cant, while
the quadratic term is negative and signi￿cant. Using the estimated parameters, the max-
imum level of income is obtained when trust is equal to 7.5, con￿rming the hump-shaped
relationship.
5.1 In medio stat virtus: unobserved heterogeneity
Another concern with the estimates in Table 2 is that the trust measure may be capturing
a general tendency of individuals with moderate attitudes￿ such as moderate risk aversion,
moderate generosity etc.￿ to succeed economically. For instance, it may be that people
who are too generous or too stingy make less income than moderately generous people, and
moderation itself is an individual characteristic which is also re￿ ected in moderate levels
of trust. After all, Aristotle a few millennia ago theorized that those who live a balanced
life and avoid excess can achieve happiness. This balance, he taught, varies among di⁄erent
persons and situations, and exists as a golden mean between two vices￿ one an excess and
one a de￿ciency.
In Table 2 we controlled for a variety of traits, but the e⁄ect of these traits on income was
assumed to be linear. To deal with the possibility that these variables have, themselves, a
hump-shaped e⁄ect captured by trust, we include in Table 3 a full set of dummies (excluding
the lowest category) for each of the traits considered. This allows for extreme attitudes to
a⁄ect income non-monotonically. In addition, we expand the set of traits to include an
index of individuals￿willingness to help others, which, like trust, can take 11 values. In
all cases but one we ￿nd that the hump shape in trust is statistically robust to this re-
speci￿cation. Furthermore, none of the other traits has a hump-shaped relationship with
respect to income.
5.2 Reverse Causality
Perhaps a more serious concern when looking at the correlation between individual income
and trust is that it may be income causing patterns in trust rather than the other way
around, as we are implicitly arguing. For instance, high income people may be more prone
to trust others if they tend to accumulate more social relations, as in Glaeser (2000), and
social relations enhance trust. Insofar as this reverse causality argument is true, the rising
portion of the trust-performance relationship that we document may re￿ ect it; however
15it cannot explain the falling part of the relationship. Similarly, if for whatever reason
high income causes lower trust, then reverse causality could explain the falling part of the
relationship but not its rising portion. Hence, reverse causality, even if present, cannot be
the full driver of the relationship; on the other hand, culture-driven diversity in trust beliefs
is able to explain both the rising and the falling parts. Indeed, identi￿cation of the e⁄ect
of trust on performance occurs through the non-linearity of the predicted relationship.
To dig deeper into the reverse causality mechanism, we exploit the implication that
income should peak at di⁄erent levels of trust when the average level of trustworthiness
in a community di⁄ers, as discussed in Section 3, Proposition 2. Since we do not directly
observe trustworthiness, we obtain a measure of a country￿ s average level of trustworthiness
by taking averages of the levels of trust of the individuals in that country. If people actually
extrapolate trust beliefs from their own trustworthiness - as in the model in Section 3 - then
the average belief is a good measure of average trustworthiness.
In Table 4 we report results of our basic model when we distinguish between below-
median, above-median and median trust countries (￿rst two columns), or when we estimate
the model separately for countries with a fat tail to the right (the high-trust countries) and
a fat tail to the left (the low trust countries) on the basis of Figure 111. As Table 4 and,
even more clearly, Figure 4, shows, in countries with below-median trust income peaks at a
level of trust equal to 7 and then declines; on the other hand it peaks at a trust level of 9 in
above-median trust countries. Consistent with our model￿ s causal mechanism, trusting a lot
can be particularly harmful in countries where the share of untrustworthy people is large.
In these countries fully trusting others results in a level of income that is 10 percentage
points lower than peak income, compared to a loss of only 4.6 percentage points in the
high-trust countries.
5.3 Robustness
If the hump-shaped relationship between trust and individual performance re￿ ects the tend-
ency to extrapolate beliefs from one￿ s own type, an obvious question is whether this e⁄ect
impacts all groups equally or whether there are some groups that are more prone to it.
The literature maintains that false consensus is persistent and universal. Hence, it should
11We de￿ne high trust countries those with fat tails to the right, including Switzerland, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Netherland, Sweden and Norway. We de￿ne low trust countries those with fat tail to the left
including Greece, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovania and Slovakia.
16not vanish with experience and should not disappear among individuals with high cognitive
ability. If these properties hold also in the context of trust beliefs, we should ￿nd that the
trust-performance relationship should retain its hump shape when we group individuals ac-
cording to experience or ability. To test whether this is actually the case, we re-estimate our
model distinguishing ￿rst between "young" and "old" (individuals below age 45 and above,
respectively) using age as a proxy for experience; and second, between high and low educa-
tion (people with less or more than a secondary education) as a proxy for cognitive ability.
Neither of these two distinctions makes a qualitative di⁄erence: the trust-performance rela-
tionship is equally hump-shaped among the "young" as it is among the "old," and equally
concave among those with a low level of education as it is among those with a high level of
education. This is apparent in Figure 5 (regression estimates are reported in Table A1).
Another possibility that could explain the hump-shaped relationship between trust and
income is heterogeneity in the cost of collecting information about the probability that
the counterpart is trustworthy. Richer people could have a more precise assessment of
the trustworthiness of the people they deal with because they can a⁄ord to pay for more
informative signals about people with whom they trade. If true, this would imply that
wealthy people would have very similar trust beliefs concentrated around the true trust-
worthiness; the middle class would have beliefs that are correct on average but somewhat
more spread out; while the poor would also have beliefs that are correct on average but
even more di⁄use. Though no systematic relationship would exist between own trustwor-
thiness and trust beliefs, the heterogeneity in beliefs precision would empirically result in
a hump-shaped relationship between trust and economic performance. This di⁄erence in
incentives to collect information has, however, another implication: dispersion in trust be-
liefs should be inversely related to the level of income. To check whether this mechanism is
what is driving our results, in Figure 6 we plot for each country the relationship between
the standard deviation of trust beliefs and income. The predicted negative relationship is
not in the data.
6 Trust and cheating
The hump-shaped relationship between individual economic performance and trust stems
from two sources of suboptimal behavior. First, too much mistrust results in poor per-
formance because it leads individuals to make decisions that are too conservative, thereby
17missing pro￿table opportunities. On the other hand, too much trust hampers performance
because it raises the chances of being cheated, and exposes individuals to larger losses con-
ditional on being cheated. The ￿rst channel implies that the chances of missing pro￿table
opportunities are smaller for those who trust more; the second channel implies that the
chances of being cheated are larger the more one trusts. Providing evidence on the ￿rst
channel is problematic because missed opportunities are, by de￿nition, unobservable. How-
ever, because we have information on how often individuals have been cheated along various
domains, we can test the second channel.
6.1 Measuring cheating experience
The ESS reports information on whether respondents have been cheated within the ￿ve
years prior to the interview along one of four dimensions: being cheated by a bank/insurance
company; a plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person; a seller of second hand
goods; or a grocer or food seller. The four dimensions of respondents￿experiences with
being cheated were asked with the question:
￿How often, if ever, have each of these things happened to you in the last ￿ve years?
1. A bank or insurance company failed to o⁄er you the best deal you were entitled to.
2. You were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty.
3. You were sold food that was packed to conceal the worse bits.
4. A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you or did un-
necessary work.
The respondent could answer in one of 5 ways￿ never, once, twice, 3 or 4 times or, ￿nally,
5 times or more￿ which we code with the numbers 0 to 4. Figure 7 shows a histogram of the
answers to each of the four cheating dimensions for the pooled data. Not surprisingly, in all
cases there is a spike at ￿Never,￿so that the vast majority of respondents report not having
been cheated. However, there is a non-negligible fraction of people, varying between 22% in
the case of the purchase of second-hand goods and over 40% in the case of food purchases,
that report having been cheated one or more times. Several people report having been
cheated more than once, but multiple experiences of being cheated decay rapidly￿ with the
18exception of food, where a fraction close to 10% still reports having been cheated 5 times
or more.
Besides analyzing the frequency with which one has been cheated in each of the four
domains, we will also construct summary indicators such as the number of times one has
been cheated over the four domains, the average number of times one has been cheated, an
indicator variable for the event of being cheated at least once across all the domains and,
￿nally a variable extracting the ￿rst principal component of the four cheating indicators.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.
6.2 Empirical speci￿cation
To test whether the chances of being cheated increase with trust we estimate the following
model:
Zd
ic = ￿Trustic + ￿Xic + ￿C + ￿R + ￿ic (6)
where Zd
ic is an indicator of how often individual i has been cheated in country C in the
domain d (cheated by a bank; or when buying food; or by a car repairer; or when buying
goods second hand). The other variables have the same meaning as before, but in this
speci￿cation trust is a single variable taking values between 0 and 10.12 We control for the
level of income to capture di⁄erences in the number of transactions people engage in for
a given level of trust. In addition, to make sure that trust is not simply a proxy for risk
attitudes, we add as a control the survey measure of risk tolerance.
Additionally, we insert into this regression a full set of country and region dummies
to account for di⁄erences across national and intra-national communities in the fraction
of cheaters, and to account for any location-speci￿c characteristic that may encourage or
discourage cheating.13 Heterogeneous cultural priors or heterogeneity in trustworthiness
coupled with false consensus generates dispersion in trust beliefs across individuals around
these location-speci￿c means, exposing them di⁄erentially to the possibility of being cheated.
These di⁄erential e⁄ects are what our regression will be capturing.
Before showing the estimates of (6) we have to confront an identi￿cation issue. Since
people learn from experience and revise their priors accordingly, those who have been
12We use a single trust measure rather than a set of dummies because later we are going to instrument trust.
Furthermore in principle being cheted should increase monotonically with trust. Unreported regressions
inserting 10 separate dummies for trust level supports this prediction.
13These ￿xed e⁄ects also take care of any variation across countries and regions in what is considered to
be cheating, and that may result in di⁄erent frequencies of reported cheating across countries and regions.
19cheated are more likely to revise their trust beliefs downwards. Because we observe the
level of trust after they have been cheated, this tends to generate a negative correlation
between cheating and trust. When we run OLS estimates of (6) for the various domains we
indeed ￿nd that this negative correlation is predominant (see the appendix, Table A2).14
To address this reverse causality issue, ideally we would need to observe the level of
trust before people were cheated, which we do not. An alternative is to instrument current
trust levels with variables that systematically a⁄ect an individual￿ s propensity to trust
others, but are unlikely to respond to shocks to being cheated. Since current trust depends
on individuals￿initial trust level and on the experience of being cheated, if we can ￿nd
variables that are correlated with initial trust we can identify the e⁄ect of trust on being
cheated.
To obtain this exogenous source of variation we follow two strategies. First, in this
sub-section we use proxies for individual trustworthiness as instruments for trust as sug-
gested by false consensus and supported by the experimental evidence provided in Section
7. Second, in the next sub-section we use variation across immigrants in the average trust
levels prevailing in their countries of origin, which they are likely to have brought with them
as they moved or to have inherited from their parents through cultural transmission.
Our instrument is a measure of how much responsibility is delegated to a person by his
manager or boss at work. Speci￿cally, the ESS asks individuals to state, on a scale from
zero to 10, how much latitude their manager grants them along three di⁄erent dimensions:
a) freedom in organizing their daily work; b) power to in￿ uence policy decisions about the
activities of the organization; and c) freedom to choose or change the pace of their work.15
We average the answers from the three parts of the delegation question to construct
a single measure of how much authority individuals￿ managers grant them on the job.
Since more trustworthy individuals are more likely, ceteris paribus, to be delegated more
power and freedom of choice, we use this variable as a proxy for individuals￿ intrinsic
14It is interesting to notice that the negative correlation is obtained even if our measure of trust is one of
generalized trust￿ the trust people entertain towards a generic other person￿ rather than the trust towards
the person (e.g. the mechanic or the food trader) that has cheated, suggesting that being cheated in one
dimension spills over into other dimensions and leads to a downward revision in trust beliefs in general.
15The exact wording is:
Please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed you
a) ... to decide how your own daily work is/was organised?
b) ... to in￿ uence policy decisions about the activities of the organisation?
c) ... to choose or change your pace of work?
20trustworthiness. And if individuals indeed extrapolate from their own type when forming
trust beliefs, this index should have predictive power on measured trust. To be a valid
instrument we also require that delegation of power on the job has no direct e⁄ect on the
risk of being cheated in the domains we observe. We do not see any obvious reason why
the amount of delegation a person is granted on the job would directly a⁄ect the chances
that this person is cheated by, for instance, a mechanic or a plumber. Similarly, we do not
see how shocks to how frequently a person is cheated in his private life￿ which is private
information and thus unobservable to the manager￿ could a⁄ect the amount of delegation
a manager grants this person on the job. The only reason why there could be a correlation
with the residuals in the cheating regression is because there could be an uncontrolled-
for characteristic of the individual￿ s personality making it obvious to an outsider that the
individual is susceptible to being cheated which would reduce delegation to this individual.
If this were the case, the IV estimates would be inconsistent. However, the inconsistency
should take the form of a downwardly biased estimate of the true e⁄ect of trust on the
frequency of being cheated. Since, as we will see, the IV estimates suggest a positive e⁄ect,
this should be taken as a lower bound of the true e⁄ect of trust on the risk of being cheated.
Table 5 shows the ￿rst stage regression, focusing on the excluded instruments. The
e⁄ect of the instrument is consistent with our expectations: it has a positive e⁄ect on the
level of individual trust and is highly statistically signi￿cant.
Table 6 shows the results of the IV estimates. The ￿rst four columns report results
for each of the four domains. In all cases, the negative e⁄ect of trust beliefs in the OLS
estimates is reversed by the IV estimates, and a positive e⁄ect of trust on the number of
times an individual has been cheated results in all domains. Economically, the e⁄ect of
trust on exposure to cheating is substantial. Increasing trust by one standard deviation
raises the number of times one is cheated by a bank by 1.5 (3 times the sample mean);
the frequency of being cheated when buying second hand goods by 0.24 (62% of the sample
mean); the frequency of being cheated when buying food by 1.3 (a bit more than the sample
mean); and increases how frequently one is cheated by a plumber or repairer by 0.98 (1.7
times the sample mean). The remaining four columns show estimates when we aggregate
the number of times individuals were cheated in the four domains into a single measure
using the total number of times cheated on any domain (column 5), the average across
the four domains (column 6), an indicator for being cheated at least once (column 7) and
21the principal component of the measure of being cheated (column 8). In all cases the IV
estimate shows a positive and highly signi￿cant e⁄ect of trust beliefs on being cheated.
The reduced form estimates of the e⁄ect of delegation (Table A3) imply that the e⁄ect
of delegation on the number of times one is cheated is close to that implied by the ￿rst
and the second stage of the IV estimates, lending indirect support to the validity of this
instrument.
Overall, these estimates imply a large e⁄ect of trust on exposure to cheating. This
is consistent with the idea that mistrust can e⁄ectively protect against the risk of being
cheated, while too much trust ampli￿es this risk and hinders individual economic perform-
ance, lending support to one of the mechanisms through which heterogeneity in trust beliefs
can produce a hump-shaped relationship between individual economic success and trust.
6.3 Immigrants, persistence and learning
The second strategy that we use to identify the e⁄ect of heterogeneous trust beliefs on
exposure to the social risk of being cheated is based on the heterogeneity in values and
beliefs among immigrants in a given country, coming from countries with di⁄erent levels
of trustworthiness. As we will see, the latter variation also allows us to provide evidence
about how persistent (wrong) trust beliefs are.
We exploit information in the ESS about respondents￿ country of origin as well as
variation in average trust across countries. The recent literature on culture and economics
shows that movers from one country to another tend to carry with them their cultural beliefs
and norms (Giuliano (2007); Fernandez and Fogli (2009); Guiso et. al. (2006)) which they
then transmit to their progeny in the new environment. Thus, either because priors instilled
by parents are slow to change or because inherited norms and values, themselves, are slow to
change, the cultural beliefs and norms prevailing in immigrants￿countries of origin continue
to shape their beliefs. Because of false consensus, people from countries that share strong
norms of commitment and trustworthiness￿ that is, people from high trust countries￿
will be more likely to form more optimistic trust beliefs than people moving from low trust
countries. Consequently, the ￿rst group should be more exposed to the risk of being cheated
than the second. Hence we can use heterogeneity in average trust in the country of origin
to identify the e⁄ect of beliefs on social risk. Since the level of trust in the country of origin
is given, and cannot be a⁄ected by migrants￿experiences of being cheated, we can exclude
22reverse causality due to learning. In e⁄ect, the average level of trust in an immigrant￿ s
country of origin is a good measure of his or her initial trust prior.16
Of course, if there is learning the e⁄ect of the initial priors may fade away and disappear
as the years in the new environment accumulate; or the e⁄ect of initial priors may be strong
in the current generation, but fade in subsequent generations who grow up and learn in
the new environment. Hence, by distinguishing between recent immigrants and immigrants
who arrived further in the past we can also shed light on how persistent false consensus
may be in reality.
To verify the persistence of the e⁄ects of initial trust beliefs, we restrict attention to the
sub-sample of the ESS comprised only of ￿rst or second generation immigrants￿ leaving
us with a sample of about 4,300 individuals. To each individual we associate the average
level of trust in their country of origin (if ￿rst generation) or the average level of trust in
the country of origin of their parents (if second generation). We then regress the number
of times individuals have been cheated along our four domains on the average trust in the
country of origin interacted with indicators for ￿rst and second generation immigrants and
the usual controls, as well as dummies for ￿rst and second generation.
Table 7 shows the results of the estimates. Trust in the country of origin has a positive,
large and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the number of times a ￿rst generation immigrant is cheated
by a bank, by a plumber or repairer, or when buying food. Trust of origin is also positively
related to how frequently individuals are cheated when purchasing second hand goods, but
the e⁄ect is estimated with a large standard error.
When we use our aggregate measures of the number of times individuals were cheated,
or the average frequency across the four domains, or their principal component (last four
columns), the e⁄ect of trust in the country of origin for the ￿rst generation immigrants is
always positive and signi￿cant - except for the probability of being cheated at least once.
16The following story that was told to one of us by Bhajan Grewal makes this point clearly. There was a
sizable number of immigrants from Punjab, India in North Queensland, Australia, who worked in sugarcane
￿elds in the latter part of the 19th century. One of them￿ Mr Singh, a hard working Punjabi Sikh￿ was
saving his earnings but keeping the money under the mattress. The Italian farmer took Mr Singh to Cairns,
the largest regional town nearby and suggested to him to deposit his capital in a bank, which he did,
reluctantly, because he had no experience with banks back home in India and because he did not trust the
Goras (the white fellas). But he respected the farmer enough not to say ￿ No￿to him. After spending a few
days with great unease, Singh expressed a strong desire to go to Cairns with the farmer on his next trip.
When in town, he went into the bank, requested to withdraw his entire account balance, counted it carefully
and deposited it all back after satisfying himself that the money was all there! The story illustrates very
well the cultural in￿ uences on immigrants priors, especially on the ￿rst generation.
23Overall, this evidence suggests that ￿rst generation immigrants who move from high-trust
countries are more likely to be victims of cheating than ￿rst generation immigrants who
move from low-trust countries. This is consistent with cultural priors exerting a life-long
e⁄ect, perhaps because of false consensus.
In the second row we test whether the average level of trust in the country of ancestors￿
origins still a⁄ects second generation immigrants. We ￿nd no evidence that this is the case.
For second generation immigrants, average trust levels in the country of their ancestors￿
origins have no e⁄ect on the number of times one is cheated in any of the speci￿cations
considered, nor in any cheating domain for which we have data.
The ESS also has some information on the number of years a person has been in the
country, allowing us to further investigate whether the e⁄ect of trust on the frequency of
being cheated attenuates as knowledge of the new environment is accumulated through
experience. For this we focus on ￿rst generation immigrants (about 2,000 observations)
and divide them into two groups: i) the newly arrived (in the country for less than 20
years); and ii) those who have been in the country for at least 20 years. We interact the
average trust level in the country of origin with an indicator for the type of immigrant. The
estimates, reported in Table 8, show a large and signi￿cant e⁄ect of trust in the country
of origin on the frequency with which new immigrants are cheated by banks, by plumbers
and by mechanics. The e⁄ect is still positive and sizable for the number of times one is
cheated when buying goods second hand or when buying food, but the coe¢ cients are not
signi￿cant. One interpretation is that on goods that are traded more frequently and for
which feedback on quality is faster￿ such as food or durables￿ learning is quicker and trust
in the country of origin stops mattering earlier. On the other hand, learning may be slow
for goods that are traded less frequently, such as repair services or ￿nancial services, and for
which feedback on the quality of the service may be obtained infrequently and ambiguously.
After all, investors in Mado⁄￿ s fund only discovered that they were cheated because of the
￿nancial crisis, and we get to know of a dishonest mechanic only after several trials, when
chance can be ruled out. The e⁄ect is still positive across all domains for the less-recent
immigrants but it is typically smaller in size and never statistically signi￿cant.
All in all, this evidence shows that exogenous variation in beliefs about others￿trust-
worthiness a⁄ects individuals￿exposure to social risk. These e⁄ects can be quite persistent,
as di⁄erences in priors that results from a tendency to extrapolate from received norms of
24trustworthiness can exert their e⁄ects for as long as 20 years.
7 Cultural norms, false consensus and heterogeneous trust
beliefs
In this section we provide evidence of heterogeneity and persistence in trust beliefs, as
well as a link to cultural norms through false consensus, in the context of a trust game
(Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)) experiment. We also document the hump-shaped
relationship between performance and beliefs in this more controlled context.
There are two reasons why it is important to document heterogeneity in beliefs in the
context of a trust game experiment. First, it has been argued that trust questions of
the sort asked in the ESS may measure not only individuals￿expectations about others￿
trustworthiness, but also their preferences for risk and betrayal aversion (Fehr, 2009; Miller
and Mitamura, 2003) or unconditional kindness (Ashraf, 2006). Hence, the heterogeneity
in Figure 1 may be due to heterogeneity in preferences rather than heterogeneity in beliefs.
For this reason, and in spite of our e⁄orts to take preferences into account, one may be
skeptical about the evidence in Section 4. In a trust game experiment we can elicit beliefs
directly, allowing us to separate beliefs from preferences. Second, one may suspect that
the heterogeneity in trust shown in Figure 1 may be the re￿ ection of heterogeneity in the
pool of people with whom each respondent interacts￿ who may well di⁄er in their actual
trustworthiness￿ rather than heterogeneity in beliefs about the average trustworthiness of
the same pool of people. Again, this objection can be overcome in the laboratory by eliciting
beliefs about the trustworthiness of a common pool of people.
7.0.1 The trust game experiment
We use selected evidence drawn from a trust game17 to measure both individuals￿own trust-
worthiness and individuals￿expectations about the trustworthiness of the other participants
in the game￿ the trust belief￿ as well as to gather information on the values instilled in
participants by their parents. The experiment involved a sample of college students at
LUISS University in Rome, and was composed of eight di⁄erent sessions, each involving an
even number of about 16 students for a total sample of 124 participants. To allow for the
17For general results and a more detailed description of the experiment see Butler, Giuliano and Guiso
(2009).
25possibility of persistence in the relationship between trust beliefs and own-trustworthiness,
the trust game was repeated for 12 rounds.18
The trust game is a two-player sequential moves game of perfect information which
proceeds as follows: in each round, half of the participants are randomly assigned the role
of the sender, while the other half are assigned the role of the receiver. At the beginning
of each round, each sender is randomly and anonymously paired with one receiver and the
sender is endowed with a sum of 10.5 euros. The sender￿ s task is to decide how much of
this endowment to send to the receiver. A slight departure from standard trust games here
is an investment fee charged to the sender: sending any positive amount entails a fee of 50
cents. The sum the sender sends is then tripled before reaching the receiver. The receiver,
in turn, decides how much to return to the sender, choosing any amount between 0 and
the sum he or she received. Additionally, within each round and regardless of role, all
participants are asked to estimate how much money receivers will return, on average, for
each amount a receiver could possible receive.19 This estimation task occurs either before
or after a participant makes his or her investment or return decision, with each order being
equally probable and independently determined for each participant.
To make sure that participants have appropriate incentives they are remunerated. In
particular, the estimation task pays for accuracy according to a quadratic scoring rule. The
appendix describes in greater detail how compensation is structured. At the end of each
round, each sender and receiver pair are told the outcome of their speci￿c interaction￿ i.e.,
how much the sender actually sent and how much the receiver sent back￿ but are not given
any information about the outcome of other pairings, nor any aggregate information.
Since participants sometimes play the role of sender and sometimes that of receiver,
for most of them (since roles are randomly assigned) we obtain both a measure of trust
beliefs and their own trustworthiness￿ besides a behavioral measure of trust: the amount
sent when sender.20 Thus, we can study whether being of a certain type is systematically
related to the formation of trust beliefs.
Additionally, participants ￿lled out a survey in which we collected information on the
18As is common with experiments, the number of rounds was limited by a ￿xed time constraint of (here,
1.5 hours) together with with how quickly the slowest participants made decisions. This led to sessions
consisting of between 3 and 12 rounds of game-play. However, the majority of sessions involved 12 rounds.
19Participants currently assigned the role of receiver are instructed to exclude their own actions from this
estimate.
20In particular, we use decisions of receivers in early rounds as a measure of initial trustworthiness that is
largely untainted by learning in the game, since little or no information is, by then, acquired.
26values that their parents emphasized during their upbringing. In some cases the question-
naire was completed one week prior to the experiment; in the remaining cases, the survey
was ￿lled out one week after the experiment.21 In the survey, respondents were asked to
report￿ on a scale between 0 and 10￿ how much emphasis their parents placed on a number
of principles and behavioral rules, such as frugality, prudence, and behaving like a model cit-
izen. Answers to some of these questions yield measures of the strength of received cultural
values and norms of trustworthiness.
Heterogeneity Figure 8 shows the distribution of trust beliefs in the ￿rst round of the
trust game, when no learning about the pool of participants had yet been possible (panel A)
and of our behavioral measure of own trustworthiness measured the ￿rst time a subject was
assigned the role of receiver (panel B).22 Since trust beliefs and trustworthiness are measured
by the average share that senders expect receivers will send back, and by the average share
that receivers report they are willing to send back, respectively, these variables take values
between 0 and 1.23 As these measures are continuous variables we report kernel density
estimates. The ￿gure documents considerable heterogeneity in trust priors, con￿rming the
evidence in Figure 1; however, since in the experiment beliefs are measured independently
of trust behavior, the heterogeneity in Figure 8, panel A, cannot be ascribed to di⁄erences
in risk attitudes.24 In the sample the average level of trust beliefs is 0.27 and its standard
deviation 0.16.
The ￿gure also documents substantial heterogeneity in behavioral trustworthiness, whose
sample mean and standard deviation are 0.32 and 0.16, respectively. In the next section we
test whether heterogeneity in trustworthiness is re￿ ected in heterogeneity in trust beliefs.
21Both the time lag and the variation in the order of survey completion were intended to mitigate the
possibility that ￿lling out the survey systematically a⁄ected participants￿actions in the experiments.
22Since we wanted to make this measure as uncontaminated by learning as possible, the sample of subjects
is restricted to those who played the role of receiver for the ￿rst time within the ￿rst three rounds. Because
roles were randomly assigned, this does not include all subjects.
23Recall that since we use the strategy method for receivers, we observe how much each receiver is willing
to return for each possible amount the sender could send. For each receiver in each round, we take the
average willingness-to-return over their entire return function, and use this as a behavioral measure of
trustworthiness.
24Unless the elicitation procedure is biased by risk preferences as well. We cannot rule this out, since we
use a quadratic scoring rule. However, there is experimental evidence suggesting that this mechanism elicits
beliefs accurately (see, e.g., Huck and Weisz￿cker, 2002).
27False consensus and persistence Table 9, panel A, shows regressions of trust beliefs on
own trustworthiness measured at various rounds. To isolate, as best as possible, trustworthi-
ness as an individual trait, we use initial trustworthiness as a regressor￿ i.e., each subject￿ s
trustworthiness measured the ￿rst time he or she played as a receiver. To reduce sampling
variation due to small sample size we aggregate observations over blocks of three rounds. As
the ￿rst column shows, initial trustworthiness is strongly positively correlated with initial
trust beliefs, lending support to the idea that individuals form beliefs about others￿trust-
worthiness by extrapolating from their own types. Quite remarkably, own trustworthiness
explains about 60% of the initial heterogeneity in beliefs. The estimate of the slope coe¢ -
cient implies that each percentage point increase in own-initial trustworthiness leads to an
increase of 0.74 percentage points in the expectation of what others will return on average.
As the second column shows, this tendency does not vanish when the game is repeated up
to 6 times and people are thus given the opportunity to learn about the pool of participants.
The correlation weakens, and the e⁄ect is somewhat smaller, but both remain sizable and
signi￿cant. The same holds true until up to the ninth round, and even after up to 12 rounds
(columns 3 and 4). Thus, initial trustworthiness still a⁄ects trust beliefs even after the game
has been played several times, always drawing from an invariant pool of individuals, which
we take as evidence that false consensus persists. However, the decline in the strength of
the link also suggests that if individuals are given enough opportunities to learn about a
stable pool of people, the tendency to attribute to others their own trustworthiness may
vanish.25
This evidence is consistent with the idea that priors are driven, through false consensus,
by norms of behavior that shape individual￿ s own trustworthiness. To make this link even
more clear and show the ultimate relationship between cultural values and beliefs we use
information on the moral values emphasized by subjects￿parents. For our purposes, we
use the answers to two values: the ￿rst is how much emphasis an individual￿ s parents
placed, on a scale between 1 and 10, on always behaving as good citizens; the second
is the emphasis an individual￿ s parents placed on loyalty to groups or organizations. We
average out the answers to these questions and take them as proxies for individuals￿intrinsic
trustworthiness￿ an individual-speci￿c trait.
25An interesting question is whether the false consensus e⁄ect reappears any time an individual faces a
new pool of people or the pool she is interacting with is subject to changes.
28Table 9, Panel B shows that this measure of the e⁄ort parents put into teaching good
values is correlated with an individual￿ s initial trustworthiness, which is consistent with
behavioral types re￿ ecting heterogeneous cultural values. Of course, it is imperfectly cor-
related, partly because the measure of values that we have is only a proxy for the true
trait, and partly because own traits are also shaped by interactions in the social sphere.
However, this measure has the advantage that it is exogenous to both the choices made
and the expectations formed when playing the trust game in the experiment. Hence we can
use it as an instrument for own initial trustworthiness when regressing trust beliefs on own
trustworthiness. Table 9, Panel C shows the results. The IV estimates imply that, initially,
individuals map their own types into their expectations one to one; this tendency persists
even after many repetitions, but becomes weaker as information is gathered and their initial
priors about the trustworthiness of the population is updated. Finally, Panel D shows the
reduced form regressions of trust beliefs on our survey measure of cultural values, which
tell a consistent story.
In sum, the evidence in this section shows three things: ￿rst, when no information is
available about a group, individuals extrapolate the trustworthiness of others from their
own, which is largely heterogeneous; second, this tendency is highly persistent, though
learning weakens it; third, heterogeneity in own trustworthiness can be traced back to
heterogeneous cultural norms instilled by parents. Measures of the latter can provide valu-
able instruments for trust beliefs, an implication that justi￿es our choice of instruments in
Section 5.
Beliefs and performance To study the relationship between trust beliefs and economic
performance we rely on a slightly modi￿ed version of the previous trust game, where,
as in the theoretical example of Section 3, we assume that the return function is concave.
Speci￿cally, we assume that sending S results in the receiver receiving 8S0:5. This guarantees
an internal solution provided there is a positive fraction of receivers that are trustworthy￿
i.e. return more than what they receive. All the rest is as in the previous game. This
modi￿ed trust game was played in four di⁄erent sessions by 56 students at LUISS. We
measure the performance of sender i as Yi = 10:5 ￿ Si + ￿j 8S0:5
i ￿ 0:5I(Si), where ￿j
denotes the proportion of the amount received, 8S0:5
i , that the receiver j paired with i
returns and I(Si) is an indicator function equal to 1 if a positive amount is sent. We use
29each sender-receiver pair￿ s outcome to compute ￿j:
Figure 9 plots the relationship between median income in the game and trust beliefs,
when observations are aggregated into three groups: those with correct beliefs (an expected
return proportion that is ￿5% actual return proportion), low trust (those who underestimate
trustworthiness by more than 5%), and those with high trust (overestimate by more than
5%).26 Since over rounds trustworthiness also evolves, we focus on the ￿rst round when a
fraction of about 35% of the receivers return more than what they are sent, implying that
in this game the probability of being "cheated" (getting back less than what one sends)
is around 65%. As the ￿gure shows, those with the right amount of trust make a higher
income than both those who trust very little and those who trust too much.27 Furthermore,
the di⁄erences are economically important: those with the right amount of trust earn 30%
more than those who mistrust and 20% more than those who trust too much, validating
the results obtained with survey data.28
8 Conclusions
A remarkable positive and monotone relationship at the aggregate level between trust and
income has been documented and gained wider acceptance in economics. In this paper
we focus on the individual relationship between trust and economic performance, ￿nding
strong evidence of a humped-shaped relation, and test one of the possible mechanisms
that could drive this result: higher exposure to social risk the more one trusts. We show
that heterogeneity in people￿ s culturally acquired trustworthiness coupled with a persistent
tendency of individuals to extrapolate from their own type when forming beliefs about
others is likely to be responsible for people￿ s departure from the rigth amount of trust,
giving rise to the hump in performance.
Our ￿ndings imply that the cost of forming wrong beliefs can be substantial, as they are
26The range refers to percentage points. For example, if the acutal return proportion in the population
is 110 percent, then the cuto⁄s for the three groups would be estimated return proportions of 105 and 115
percent. Widening the bands up to ￿5% has no e⁄ect.
27In the ￿gure, open circles represent the observed outcomes. Since only half of participants were senders
in the ￿rst round, there are 28 total observations.
28In subsequent rounds the relationship between performance and trust beliefs becomes ￿rst ￿ atter and
than monotonically decreasing. This is because over repetitions behavioural trustworthiness declines￿ an
issue we study elsewhere (Butler et. al. (2009))￿ and after round 4 no receiver returns more than what is
sent, implying that optimal trust is no trust. Still, many participants insist on trusting more than the right
amount, and therefore performing worse than they could if they trusted as much as they should.
30of the same order of magnitude as returns to education. Yet, though both excessive trust
and excessive mistrust are individually costly, in the data the income cost of trusting too
little far exceeds that of trusting too much, even in the pool of low trust countries. There is
however one important di⁄erence between the two excesses. While excessive mistrust and
excessive trust are both individually costly, mistrust is also socially costly as it reduces -
at least in our context - the creation of surplus. On the contrary exceeding in trust, while
costly to the individual, may be bene￿cial to society at large as it promotes surplus creation.
This di⁄erence reconciles our ￿ndings of a hump-shaped relation between performance and
trust in individual level data and the monotonically increasing relation in aggregate data.
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34Appendix 1: Trust Experiment Design
The experiment implemented twelve rounds of a standard trust game, with a few modi-
￿cations. The modi￿cations will be made clear in in the description below.
The trust game is a two-player sequential-moves game of perfect information. The
￿rst-mover, an investor, is endowed with 10:50 euros. This investor is paired with a an
entrepreneur who has no endowment. The investor chooses to send some, all or none of
his or her endowment to the entrepreneur. Any amount sent is tripled by the experimenter
before being given to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is then free to return some, all or
none of this tripled amount back to the investor, ending the game.
In the trust game used presently, the investor was charged a small fee￿ 0:50 euros￿
in order to send a positive amount to the entrepreneur. If the investor decided to invest
nothing, no fee was charged. Conditional on paying the investment fee, the investor could
send any integer amount to the entrepreneur, s 2 f1;:::;10g.
The entrepreneur￿ s decision was elicited using the strategy method. For each of the ten
possible amounts the entrepreneur could receive, m 2 f3;:::;30g, the entrepreneur was
asked how much they would send back to the investor. The order in which these amounts
were presented was randomized￿ but the same realization applied to all entrepreneurs in
a given round. Implementing a random ordering was intended to avoid inducing undue
consistency across amounts; while making the realization the same for all entrepreneurs
within a round allows for comparability across subjects within rounds.
Additionally, within each round every subject, regardless of the role they were currently
assigned, was asked to estimate the amount entrepreneurs would return, on average, for each
possible amount entrepreneurs could receive. Subjects currently assigned the role of entre-
preneur were asked to estimate how much other entrepreneurs would return, to rule out any
mechanical￿ real or imagined￿ connection between own-actions and estimates. Incentives
to report beliefs truthfully were given by paying subjects according to a quadratic scoring
rule. It is well-known that this rule gives risk-neutral individuals incentives compatible with
reporting truthfully the mean of their subjective distribution of beliefs.
Speci￿cally, for each of the ten amounts an entrepreneur could possibly receive, subjects
earned money according to the accuracy of their estimates according to the function:
Earnings = 1 ￿ (
c rm ￿ rm
m
)2
35For example, if a subject￿ s estimate of entrepreneurs￿average return amount conditional
on receiving 9 euros was 6 euros￿ i.e., b r9 = 6, and entrepreneurs, on average, committed to








Each perfect estimate paid 1 euro, so that subjects could earn up to 10 euros each round
from estimating entrepreneurs￿actions correctly.
At the end of each round, subjects were informed of the outcome of their particular
pairing, but not of any aggregate outcomes. So, for instance, an entrepreneur would be
informed of whether and how much her investor invested, and, therefore how much they
personally returned and earned. But she was not given information on any other investor-
entrepreneur pair￿ s outcome. Roles were then randomly reassigned, begining a new round.
Subjects typically played a total of 12 rounds, with random reassignment of roles after
each round.29 Because pairings could, in principle be repeated, there was scope for subjects
to learn about the population, as desired. When all rounds were completed, one round was
selected at random to count for subjects￿payment.
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 1.
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Appendix 3: The European Social Survey
The central aim of the ESS is to gather data about changing values, attitudes, attributes
and behavior patterns within European polities. Academically driven but designed to feed
into key European policy debates, the ESS hopes to measure and explain how people￿ s social
values, cultural norms and behavior patterns are distributed; the ways in which they di⁄er
within and between nations; and the direction and speed at which they are changing.
29Because of time constraints, the number of rounds varied from a low of 3, to a high of 12. The majority
of sessions involved 12 rounds, however.
36Data collection takes place every two years, by means of face-to-face interviews lasting
around one hour, which are followed by a short supplement. The questionnaire consists of
a ￿ core￿module lasting about half an hour￿ which remains relatively constant from round
to round￿ plus two ￿ rotating￿modules, repeated at intervals. Each of these latter modules
is devoted to a substantive topic or theme.
The purpose of the rotating modules is to provide an in-depth focus on a series of
particular academic or policy concerns, while the core module aims instead to monitor
change or continuity in a wide range of socio-economic, socio-political, socio-psychological
and socio-demographic variables.
We use the second round of the ESS containint the following 26 countries: Austria, Bel-
gium. Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France,
Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine.
Each respondent in the European Social Survey is asked to report which income category,
identi￿ed with a letter, best approximates his or her household￿ s total net income. The
values, in euros, are de￿ned according to the following table:
Household income
Approximate weekly Approximate monthly Approximate annual
J Less than 40 Less than 150 Less than 1800
R 40 to under 70 150 to under 300 1800 to under 3600
C 70 to under 120 300 to under 500 3600 to under 6000
M 120 to under 230 500 to under 1000 6000 to under 12000
F 230 to under 350 1000 to under 1500 12000 to under 18000
S 350 to under 460 1500 to under 2000 18000 to under 24000
K 460 to under 580 2000 to under 2500 24000 to under 30000
P 580 to under 690 2500 to under 3000 30000 to under 36000
D 690 to under 1150 3000 to under 5000 36000 to under 60000
H 1150 to under 1730 5000 to under 7500 60000 to under 90000
U 1730 to under 2310 7500 to under 10000 90000 to under 120000






Trust and Income, by Education and Age 
  Log inc  Log income  Log inc  Log inc 




Lesser or equal 
than 45 years old 
Older than 45 years
Trust 1  0.031  -0.028  0.015  -0.008 
  (0.033) (0.041) (0.035) (0.036) 
Trust  2  0.045 0.036 0.050 0.030 
  (0.029) (0.042) (0.039) (0.034) 
Trust 3  0.076**  0.078**  0.106***  0.053* 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.029) 
Trust 4  0.083**  0.074**  0.096***  0.047 
  (0.035) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) 
Trust 5  0.090***  0.068**  0.092***  0.064** 
  (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) 
Trust  6  0.103*** 0.130*** 0.142*** 0.089*** 
  (0.035) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) 
Trust  7  0.146*** 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.119*** 
  (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) 
Trust  8  0.138*** 0.161*** 0.145*** 0.126*** 
  (0.037) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) 
Trust  9  0.141** 0.149*** 0.113** 0.142*** 
  (0.065) (0.034) (0.041) (0.045) 
Trust 10  0.070  0.071  0.044  0.094* 
  (0.051) (0.045) (0.066) (0.049) 
Observations 11007  17376  14094  14289 
R-squared  0.60 0.59 0.60 0.66 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects;  
[2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   
[3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”;  
[4] Column 1 and 2 restrict the sample to individuals with education lower than secondary and equal and greater than secondary respectively; columns 3 






Trust and Cheating, OLS Regressions 


























Trust -0.020***  -0.016*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.088*** -0.024*** -0.010*** -0.046*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.002) (0.007) 
Age  0.018***  -0.006*** 0.017***  0.013***  0.040*** 0.010*** 0.005***  0.019*** 
  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.005) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male  0.134***  0.096*** -0.148*** 0.130***  0.244*** 0.042*** 0.027***  0.165*** 
  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.026) (0.016) (0.040)  (0.008)  (0.008) (0.022) 
Immigrant 0.005  0.039**  -0.007  0.036  0.058  0.021  -0.006  0.034 
  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.056) (0.042) (0.110)  (0.027)  (0.014) (0.054) 
Married  -0.004  -0.013 0.018  -0.069***  -0.055 -0.018 -0.003  -0.032 
  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.023) (0.019) (0.053)  (0.013)  (0.011) (0.027) 
Single -0.109***  0.002  -0.100*** -0.142***  -0.335*** -0.089*** -0.030**  -0.168*** 
  (0.027)  (0.015)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.054)  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.028) 
Primary -0.123***  -0.000  -0.142**  -0.111***  -0.342*** -0.094*** -0.064*** -0.170*** 
  (0.033)  (0.026)  (0.055) (0.039) (0.092)  (0.024)  (0.018) (0.045) 
Secondary  -0.065**  0.017  -0.104** -0.085*** -0.225**  -0.056*** -0.017  -0.105** 
  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.040) (0.025) (0.080)  (0.017)  (0.013) (0.040) 
Father primary  -0.101***  -0.071** -0.133*** -0.168*** -0.482*** -0.120*** -0.068*** -0.244*** 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.039) (0.030) (0.079)  (0.021)  (0.009) (0.042) 
Father secondary  -0.085***  -0.050*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.363*** -0.095*** -0.042*** -0.185*** 
  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.028) (0.023) (0.047)  (0.014)  (0.009) (0.025) 
Unemployed  0.020  0.038 0.073  0.015  0.111 0.041 0.018  0.051 
  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.057) (0.030) (0.118)  (0.028)  (0.021) (0.059) 
Out  of  labor  force  0.012  0.016  0.122***  0.025  0.174*** 0.048*** 0.021***  0.075** 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.027) (0.015) (0.056)  (0.012)  (0.006) (0.027) 
Risk aversion  0.027***  0.016***  -0.003 0.022***  0.061***  0.013*** 0.002  0.035*** 
  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.016)  (0.004)  (0.002) (0.008) 
Log income  0.044***  -0.011  0.043**  0.048***  0.120***  0.029**  0.020***  0.058*** 
  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.020) (0.011) (0.031)  (0.010)  (0.007) (0.015)  
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Big city  0.022  0.001  0.152***  0.064***  0.294***  0.058**  0.051***  0.133*** 
  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.051) (0.015) (0.075)  (0.021)  (0.012) (0.034) 
Small  city  0.016  0.028 0.095*** 0.048** 0.191**  0.054*** 0.022  0.091** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.034) (0.021) (0.069)  (0.018)  (0.013) (0.034) 
Observations 21616  23138  23592  22961  20190  24287  22150  20190 
R-squared  0.10  0.10 0.13  0.08  0.15 0.14 0.14  0.14 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and 8 occupational dummies 
[2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   
[3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; 
Trustworthiness is the sum of the following three questions: “I am going to read out a list of things about your working life. Using this card, please say 
how much the management at your work allows/allowed you to 1) decide how your own daily work is/was organized; 2) influence policy decisions 
about the activities of the organization? 3) to choose or change your pace of work?” The answer to each question can take values from I have/had no 
influence (0) to I have had complete control (10).   
[4] The cheating variables are the answer to the following questions: “how often, if ever, have each of these things happened to you in the last five 
years? A bank or insurance company failed to offer you the best deal you were entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to 
be faulty; you were sold food that was packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you or 






















Trust and Cheating, Reduced Forms Regressions 


























Trustworthiness 0.007***  0.002**  0.005**  0.005***  0.020*** 0.004*** 0.002***  0.010*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age 0.016***  -0.006*** 0.017***  0.012***  0.035*** 0.009*** 0.004***  0.017*** 
 (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.010) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.005) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male 0.122***  0.092***  -0.163*** 0.121*** 0.197***  0.034*** 0.022**  0.141*** 
 (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.040) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.023) 
Immigrant  0.018  0.043**  0.001 0.038 0.088  0.026  -0.003 0.050 
 (0.034)  (0.018)  (0.057)  (0.042)  (0.111) (0.028) (0.015)  (0.054) 
Married  -0.007  -0.014 0.009  -0.067***  -0.068 -0.021 -0.005  -0.038 
 (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.052) (0.013) (0.011)  (0.028) 
Single -0.109***  0.002  -0.105*** -0.139***  -0.333*** -0.090*** -0.031**  -0.166*** 
 (0.029)  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.053) (0.013) (0.011)  (0.028) 
Primary -0.111***  0.011  -0.129**  -0.093**  -0.287*** -0.080*** -0.057*** -0.141*** 
 (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.055)  (0.038)  (0.089) (0.023) (0.017)  (0.044) 
Secondary  -0.059*  0.024  -0.094** -0.074*** -0.190** -0.047**  -0.013  -0.087** 
 (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.079) (0.017) (0.013)  (0.040) 
Father primary  -0.073**  -0.061** -0.111*** -0.140*** -0.399*** -0.099*** -0.062*** -0.200*** 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.039)  (0.028)  (0.071) (0.018) (0.008)  (0.038) 
Father secondary  -0.068***  -0.045*** -0.117*** -0.099***  -0.321*** -0.086*** -0.038*** -0.162*** 
 (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.048) (0.014) (0.009)  (0.025) 
Unemployed  0.048  0.051*  0.094 0.036 0.191  0.062**  0.028 0.093 
 (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.056)  (0.032)  (0.115) (0.029) (0.021)  (0.058) 
Out of labor force  0.023*  0.019  0.127***  0.030*  0.202***  0.054***  0.022***  0.090*** 
 (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.016)  (0.056) (0.012) (0.006)  (0.027) 
Risk aversion  0.024***  0.015***  -0.005  0.020*** 0.054*** 0.011**  0.001  0.032*** 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.015) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.007) 
Log income  0.035**  -0.011  0.035  0.040***  0.091***  0.022**  0.017**  0.044*** 
 (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.032) (0.011) (0.007)  (0.016)  
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Big city  0.027  0.005  0.151***  0.063***  0.299***  0.059**  0.053***  0.136*** 
 (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.052)  (0.015)  (0.077) (0.022) (0.012)  (0.035) 
Small city  0.018  0.031*  0.101***  0.052**  0.202***  0.059***  0.023*  0.097*** 
 (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.033)  (0.020)  (0.066) (0.018) (0.013)  (0.032) 
Observations  21191  22667  23094 22495 19796  23778  21695 19796 
R-squared  0.10  0.10 0.13  0.08  0.14 0.13 0.13  0.14 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and 8 occupational dummies 
[2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   
[3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; 
Trustworthiness is the sum of the following three questions: “I am going to read out a list of things about your working life. Using this card, please say 
how much the management at your work allows/allowed you to 1) decide how your own daily work is/was organized; 2) influence policy decisions 
about the activities of the organization? 3) to choose or change your pace of work?” The answer to each question can take values from I have/had no 
influence (0) to I have had complete control (10).   
[4] The cheating variables are the answer to the following questions: “how often, if ever, have each of these things happened to you in the last five 
years? A bank or insurance company failed to offer you the best deal you were entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to 
be faulty; you were sold food that was packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you or 
did unnecessary work” The answer could take values Never (1), once (2), twice (3), 3 or 4 time (4) 5 times or more (5)  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
A. European Social Survey 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Log income  28383  9.695  1.072  6.908  11.775 
Trust  28383  5.033  2.498  0  10 
Risk tolerance  28383  2.982  1.429  1  6 
Age  28383  46.691  17.771  13  96 
Male  28383  0.473  0.499  0  1 
Immigrant  28383  0.075  0.263  0  1 
Married  28383  0.558  0.497  0  1 
Single  28383  0.263  0.440  0  1 
Father primary  28383  0.406  0.491  0  1 
Father secondary  28383  0.487  0.500  0  1 
Primary  28383  0.192  0.394  0  1 
Secondary  28383  0.605  0.489  0  1 
Big city  28383  0.323  0.468  0  1 
Small city  28383  0.308  0.462  0  1 
Unemployed  28383  0.051  0.220  0  1 
Out of labor force  28383  0.535  0.499  0  1 
Altruism 1  28272  5.052  0.886  1  6 
Altruism 2  28134  4.913  1.016  1  6 
Altruism 3  27687  3.862  0.791  1  5 
Bank  21103  1.494  0.892  1  5 
Second hand  22562  1.374  0.792  1  5 
Food  22986  2.106  1.435  1  5 
Plumber,repairer  22390  1.629  1.000  1  5 
Cheated (sum)  19722  2.473  2.753  0  16 
Cheated (average)  23661  0.677  0.741  0  4 
Cheated (at least once)  21603  0.668  0.471  0  1 
Cheated (principal component)  19722  0.099  1.379  -1.117  7.349 
Trustworthiness  21103  16.177  9.454  0  30   44
Professionals  21103  0.137  0.344  0  1 
Technicians  21103  0.164  0.370  0  1 
Clerks  21103  0.109  0.312  0  1 
Workers  21103  0.142  0.349  0  1 
Agricultural workers  21103  0.041  0.197  0  1 
Mechanics, repairers, textile workers  21103  0.137  0.344  0  1 
Assemblers, operators and drivers  21103  0.079  0.270  0  1 
Labourers and elementary occupations  21103  0.103  0.303  0  1 
Fraction of first generation immigrants  48971  0.081  0.273  0  1 
Fraction of second generation immigrants  48977  0.071  0.257  0  1 
First generation immigrants: old arrivals  3942  0.535  0.499  0  1 
First generation immigrants: new arrivals  3942  0.465  0.499  0  1 




Variable obs  mean  St  dev  min  max 
Good Values  113  0.637  0.199  0.05  1 
Initial own trustworthiness  92  0.32  0.162  0  1 
Expected trustworthiness (trust belief) 1122  0.265  0.158  0  1 
Return Proportion  561  0.211  0.18  0  1 
Invest Amount  561  5.258  3.107  0  10 
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Table 2 
Trust and Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc 
Trust  1  0.015 0.003 0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.004   
  (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)   
Trust  2  0.070**  0.031 0.039 0.035 0.025 0.038   
  (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026)   
Trust  3  0.130*** 0.071*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.082***   
  (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)   
Trust  4  0.171*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.082***   
  (0.030) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)   
Trust  5  0.163*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.077*** 0.083***   
  (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)   
Trust  6  0.269*** 0.119*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.127***   
  (0.030) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)   
Trust  7  0.304*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.132*** 0.142***   
  (0.034) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)   
Trust  8  0.295*** 0.138*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.136*** 0.145***   
  (0.037) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)   
Trust  9  0.255*** 0.133*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.130*** 0.138***   
  (0.049) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)   
Trust  10  0.105*  0.071*  0.079* 0.091** 0.076*  0.077*   
  (0.057) (0.038) (0.040) (0.037) (0.041) (0.040)   
Age    0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age  squared    -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male    0.049*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 
    (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Immigrant    -0.158*** -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.158*** 
    (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Married    0.408*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.405*** 0.406*** 0.407*** 
    (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Single    0.115*** 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
    (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
Father primary educ.    -0.155***  -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.157*** 
    (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)   46
Father  secondary  educ.    -0.054** -0.057** -0.057** -0.057** -0.058** -0.057** 
    (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Unemployed   -0.508***  -0.500***  -0.506*** -0.498*** -0.500*** -0.501*** 
    (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Out of labor force    -0.179***  -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.167*** -0.167*** 
    (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Primary educ.    -0.483***  -0.480***  -0.478*** -0.484*** -0.481*** -0.482*** 
    (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Secondary educ.    -0.262***  -0.261*** -0.262*** -0.263*** -0.261*** -0.263*** 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Big  city    0.065** 0.072** 0.073** 0.070** 0.072** 0.073** 
    (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Small  city    0.031  0.039* 0.037* 0.038* 0.039* 0.040* 
    (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Risk  tolerance      0.015***  0.014**  0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Trust         0.030*** 
         (0.007) 
T r u s t   s q u a r e d          - 0 . 0 0 2 * *  
         (0.001) 
Altruism  1      -0.019**     
      (0.009)     
Altruism  2       -0.015**    
       (0.006)    
Altruism  3        0.003   
        (0.006)   
Observations  35791 30254 28383 27687 28134 28272 28383 
R-squared 0.49  0.62  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Test trust2= trust8 (p-values)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Test trust10=trust8 (p-values) 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.10   
Trust=trust  squared         0.00 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and region fixed effects; the F-test for the joint significant of these coefficients has always p-value of 0.000; [2] Standard errors are clustered 
at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [2] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be 
trusted”; Risk tolerance, Altruism 1 and Altruism 2 are the answers to the following question: “Now I will briefly describe some people. Tell me how much each person is or is not like you: very 
much like me (6), like me (5), somewhat like me (4), a little like me (3), not like me (2), not like me at all (1); She/he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She/he wants to have an 
exciting life.  (Risk aversion); It is important to her/him to be loyal to her/his friends. She/he wants to devote herself/himself to people close to her/him.(Altruism 1) and “She thinks it is 
important that every person in the world should be treated equally and have equal opportunities”; Altruism 3 is the answer to the following question: “How much do you agree or disagree 
with this statement? Citizens should spend at least some of their free time helping others” Agree strongly (5), agree (4), neither agree nor disagree (3), disagree (2), disagree strongly (1)   47
Table 3 
Trust and Income, Controlling for a Variety of Personal Traits 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Trust  0.003  0.037  0.079***  0.081*** 0.081*** 0.124*** 0.139*** 0.143*** 0.136***  0.079* 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.035)  (0.040) 
Risk tolerance  0.025** 0.047*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.054*           
  (0.011) (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.029)           
Test of equality  
of coef. (p-values) 






     
Trust  0.003  0.036  0.079***  0.079*** 0.080*** 0.124*** 0.139*** 0.143*** 0.135***  0.079* 
  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.035)  (0.040) 
Loyalty  0.086 0.095  0.089  0.110  0.098           
  (0.109) (0.079)  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.073)           
Test of equality  
of coef. (p-values) 






     
Trust  -0.010  0.021  0.055**  0.055**  0.056**  0.095*** 0.110*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.081** 
  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.034)  (0.038) 
Helpful  0.018  0.021  0.068**  0.050  0.041 0.054**  0.077** 0.039  0.030 -0.055 
  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.030) (0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034)  (0.032) 
Test of equality  
of coef. (p-values) 






     
Trust  0.004  0.033  0.084***  0.079*** 0.083*** 0.121*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.090** 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.020)  (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.035)  (0.037) 
Help others  -0.005  -0.037  -0.043  -0.072         
  (0.057)  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.064)         
Test of equality  
of coef. (p-values) 






     
Trust  -0.005  0.024  0.073***  0.071*** 0.075*** 0.115*** 0.129*** 0.134*** 0.128***  0.075* 
  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.034)  (0.041) 
Equal opport.  -0.047 -0.021  -0.063  -0.067* -0.088**           
  (0.049) (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.035)           
Test of equality  
of coef. (p-values) 






     
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and the full set of controls of column 3 Table 2;  
[2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [3] Trust is the answer to the following 
question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 
0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; Risk tolerance, Loyalty and Equal opportunities are the answers to the   48
following question: “Now I will briefly describe some people. Tell me how much each person is or is not like you: very much like me (6), like me (5), somewhat 
like me (4), a little like me (3), not like me (2), not like me at all (1); She/he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She/he wants to have an exciting life.  
(Risk aversion); It is important to her/him to be loyal to her/his friends. She/he wants to devote herself/himself to people close to her/him.(Loyalty) and “She 
thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally and have equal opportunities” (Equal opportunities); Helping others  is the answer to the 
following question: “How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? Citizens should spend at least some of their free time helping others” Agree 
strongly (5), agree (4), neither agree nor disagree (3), disagree (2), disagree strongly (1).; Helpful is the answer to the following question: Would you say that most 
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Table 4 
Trust and Income, by Different Levels of Trust 
  Log  income Log  income Log  income Log  income 
  Trust lower than 
median  
Trust above or 
equal to median 
Low trust  High trust 
Trust 1  0.011  -0.001  0.008  0.007 
  (0.027) (0.046) (0.027) (0.051) 
Trust 2  -0.005  0.105**  0.006  0.103** 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) (0.042) 
Trust 3  0.069**  0.100**  0.060**  0.113*** 
  (0.025) (0.035) (0.025) (0.036) 
Trust  4  0.058* 0.104*** 0.058* 0.109*** 
  (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.032) 
Trust  5  0.085*** 0.086** 0.076*** 0.095** 
  (0.021) (0.032) (0.022) (0.034) 
Trust  6  0.140*** 0.130*** 0.143*** 0.130*** 
  (0.038) (0.024) (0.035) (0.026) 
Trust  7  0.144*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 
  (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) 
Trust 8  0.116*  0.162***  0.120**  0.165*** 
  (0.051) (0.028) (0.048) (0.031) 
Trust  9  0.053 0.163*** 0.049 0.167*** 
  (0.099) (0.037) (0.094) (0.039) 
Trust  10  0.066 0.093* 0.063 0.097* 
  (0.059) (0.051) (0.055) (0.054) 
Observations 9971  18412  10916  17467 
R-squared 0.42  0.51  0.46  0.51 
Test of equality of coeff. tru7=tru9 (0.14)  tru9=tru10 (0.07)  tru7=tru9 (0.09)  tru9=tru10 (0.08) 
(p-values)  tru7=tru2 (0.00)  tru9=tru2 (0.07) tru7=tru2  (0.00) tru9=tru2  (0.05) 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects; [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, * significant at 10%. [3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”;  
[4] Column 1 restrict the sample to countries with trust lower than the median in the sample (equal to 5); column 2 restricts the sample to countries with trust 
equal or higher than the median; [5] In columns 3, we define low trust countries those with fat tail to the left including Greece,  Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovania and Slovakia; in column 4, we define high trust countries those with fat tails to the right, including Switzerland, Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Netherland, Sweden and Norway.  
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Table 5 
Trust and Cheating: First Stage Regressions 
 


























Trustworthiness .0084***  .0078***  .0082*** .0087*** .0089*** .0081*** .0088***  .0089*** 
  (.0020) (.0019)  (.0019) (.0019) (.0021)  (.0019)  (.0020) (.0021) 
Observations  21163 22663  23062 22463 19774  23741  21670 19774 
R-squared  0.23  0.23 0.23  0.23  0.24 0.22 0.23  0.23 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and 8 occupational dummies 
[2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   
[3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; Trustworthiness is the 
sum of the following three questions: “I am going to read out a list of things about your working life. Using this card, please say how much the management at 
your work allows/allowed you to 1) decide how your own daily work is/was organized; 2) influence policy decisions about the activities of the organization? 3) to 
choose or change your pace of work?” The answer to each question can take values from I have/had no influence (0) to I have had complete control (10).   
[4] The cheating variables are the answer to the following questions: “how often, if ever, have each of these things happened to you in the last five years? A bank 
or insurance company failed to offer you the best deal you were entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty; you were sold 
food that was packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you or did unnecessary work” The answer 
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Table 6 
Trust and Cheating, Instrumental Variable Regressions 

























Trust 0.817***  0.234**  0.599***  0.534*** 2.271***  0.486***  0.251***  1.164*** 
  (0.219)  (0.100) (0.197)  (0.158)  (0.610) (0.138) (0.074) (0.312) 
Age  0.010*  -0.008***  0.013***  0.008* 0.016 0.007** 0.002  0.007 
  (0.006)  (0.003) (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.099***  0.088***  -0.173***  0.112***  0.128  0.025  0.019*  0.106** 
  (0.033)  (0.015) (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.096) (0.020) (0.011) (0.049) 
Immigrant 0.009  0.043*  -0.004  0.033  0.046  0.024  -0.006  0.028 
  (0.057)  (0.026) (0.051)  (0.044)  (0.171) (0.035) (0.020) (0.087) 
Married -0.160***  -0.059**  -0.108** -0.174*** -0.538*** -0.116*** -0.056***  -0.279*** 
  (0.059)  (0.026) (0.054)  (0.045)  (0.178) (0.037) (0.021) (0.091) 
Single -0.279***  -0.047  -0.235*** -0.254*** -0.795***  -0.196***  -0.087***  -0.403*** 
  (0.069)  (0.031) (0.064)  (0.052)  (0.199) (0.044) (0.025) (0.102) 
Primary 0.214**  0.103**  0.114  0.117  0.662**  0.108  0.045  0.345** 
  (0.109)  (0.048) (0.099)  (0.079)  (0.319) (0.067) (0.038) (0.163) 
Secondary 0.202**  0.099***  0.090  0.090  0.573**  0.102**  0.065**  0.304** 
  (0.081)  (0.037) (0.072)  (0.058)  (0.238) (0.049) (0.027) (0.122) 
Father primary  0.236**  0.023  0.110  0.054  0.379  0.086  0.027  0.199 
  (0.100)  (0.045) (0.090)  (0.072)  (0.267) (0.063) (0.033) (0.136) 
Father secondary  0.155**  0.017  0.030  0.045  0.267  0.042  0.027  0.140 
  (0.076)  (0.035) (0.066)  (0.057)  (0.210) (0.047) (0.025) (0.107) 
Unemployed 0.250***  0.112***  0.249***  0.161** 0.692*** 0.188*** 0.085*** 0.350*** 
  (0.092)  (0.043) (0.085)  (0.067)  (0.258) (0.059) (0.031) (0.132) 
Out of labor force  0.056  0.035**  0.167***  0.071** 0.283*** 0.087*** 0.039***  0.131** 
  (0.036)  (0.017) (0.035)  (0.029)  (0.105) (0.024) (0.013) (0.053) 
Risk tolerance  -0.009  0.006  -0.031**  -0.001  -0.043  -0.009  -0.010*  -0.018 
  (0.015)  (0.007) (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.044) (0.009) (0.005) (0.023) 
Log income  -0.049  -0.036**  -0.030  -0.017  -0.133 -0.031 -0.010 -0.071 
  (0.033)  (0.015) (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.092) (0.021) (0.011) (0.047) 
Big city  0.095**  0.024  0.195***  0.113***  0.481***  0.098***  0.075***  0.230*** 
  (0.044)  (0.020) (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.125) (0.027) (0.015) (0.064) 
Small city  0.123***  0.058***  0.166***  0.114*** 0.489***  0.115***  0.052***  0.244*** 
  (0.046)  (0.020) (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.130) (0.027) (0.015) (0.067) 
Observations  21163 22633 23062  22463  19774 23741 21670 19774 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and 8 occupational dummies [2] Standard errors are clustered 
at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [3] Trust is the answer to the following 
question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be 
trusted”; [4] Trust is instrumented using the following two variables: Trustworthiness is the sum of the following three questions: “I 
am going to read out a list of things about your working life. Using this card, please say how much the management at your work 
allows/allowed you to 1) decide how your own daily work is/was organized; 2) influence policy decisions about the activities of the 
organization? 3) to choose or change your pace of work?” The answer to each question can take values from I have/had no 
influence (0) to I have had complete control (10).   
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Table 7 
Trust and Cheating, Evidence from First and Second Generation Immigrants 

























Trust-first gen.  0.271**  0.080  0.666***  0.348*  1.491***  0.304***  0.110  0.698*** 
  (0.103)  (0.154)  (0.220)  (0.195)  (0.489) (0.098) (0.066) (0.240) 
Trust-second  gen.  -0.031  0.127  -0.224  -0.066  -0.493 -0.004 -0.046 -0.218 
  (0.194)  (0.211)  (0.171)  (0.265)  (0.614) (0.131) (0.115) (0.326) 
Risk tolerance  0.031***  0.030**  0.004 -0.006 0.063  0.011  0.010  0.036 
  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.054) (0.010) (0.008) (0.027) 
Age 0.024***  0.003  0.036*** 0.016*** 0.072***  0.019*** 0.011*** 0.036*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000*  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.001***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.149***  0.027  -0.170**  0.101*** 0.092  0.015  -0.011  0.089 
  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.066)  (0.037)  (0.144) (0.033) (0.012) (0.071) 
Married 0.010  -0.052  -0.043  -0.048  -0.068  -0.054  0.007  -0.035 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.060)  (0.049)  (0.156) (0.032) (0.033) (0.079) 
Single -0.048  -0.004  -0.054  -0.217***  -0.291**  -0.093***  -0.019  -0.144* 
  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.142) (0.032) (0.036) (0.075) 
Primary -0.266***  0.024  -0.292***  -0.346***  -0.983***  -0.199***  -0.129***  -0.490*** 
  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.087)  (0.071)  (0.180) (0.045) (0.034) (0.089) 
Secondary -0.190***  -0.017  -0.254***  -0.281***  -0.770***  -0.181***  -0.089**  -0.378*** 
  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.056)  (0.165) (0.026) (0.033) (0.081) 
Unemployed 0.005  0.046  -0.031  -0.032  -0.121  0.019  -0.052  -0.058 
  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.101)  (0.060)  (0.236) (0.045) (0.039) (0.113) 
Out of labor force  -0.032  -0.014  0.092  0.009  0.060  0.024  0.003  0.020 
  (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.059)  (0.035)  (0.117) (0.027) (0.016) (0.056) 
Big city  -0.018  -0.008  0.042  0.060  0.150  0.007  0.023  0.068 
  (0.028)  (0.038)  (0.051)  (0.058)  (0.120) (0.044) (0.018) (0.061) 
Small city  -0.049  -0.002  0.018  0.057  -0.007  0.011  0.008  -0.007 
  (0.034)  (0.019)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.124) (0.023) (0.017) (0.061) 
First generation  -0.106  0.060  -0.269***  -0.112  -0.596***  -0.077*  -0.053  -0.270** 
  (0.071)  (0.078)  (0.084)  (0.074)  (0.191) (0.039) (0.041) (0.103) 
Observations 3724  4165  4364  4086  3404  4515  3879  3404 
R-squared 0.15  0.13  0.15  0.11  0.17  0.15  0.15  0.17 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and region fixed effects. [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin 
level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [3] Trust is the average, calculated at the country level from 
the World Value Survey, of the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted (1) or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people (0)? [4] The cheating variables are the answer to the following questions: “how 
often, if ever, has each of these things happened to you in the last five years? A bank or insurance company failed to offer you the 
best deal you were entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty; you were sold food that 
was packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you or did 
unnecessary work” The answer could take values Never (1), once (2), twice (3), 3 or 4 time (4), 5 times or more (5). [5] First 
generation immigrants are defined as individuals born in countries different than the country of residence; Second generation 
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Table 8 
Trust and Cheating, First Generation Immigrants, by Year of Arrival 

























Trust: new arrivals  0.663*  0.292  0.473  0.770**  2.022*  0.534***  0.165  1.056* 
 (0.381)  (0.279)  (0.444)  (0.332)  (1.056) (0.195)  (0.146)  (0.534) 
Trust: old arrivals  0.206  0.114  0.425  0.123  1.190  0.160  -0.016  0.578 
 (0.189)  (0.196)  (0.294)  (0.312)  (0.810) (0.186)  (0.064)  (0.411) 
Risk tolerance  0.055***  0.030*  0.013  0.002  0.101*  0.015  0.013  0.056* 
 (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.058) (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.030) 
Age 0.021**  -0.005  0.038***  0.008  0.057** 0.017***  0.010***  0.028** 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.023) (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000*  -0.001*** -0.000***  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male 0.112**  -0.034  -0.170**  0.075  -0.055  0.001  -0.032  0.005 
 (0.043)  (0.054)  (0.074)  (0.046)  (0.175) (0.038)  (0.027)  (0.090) 
Married -0.011  -0.011 -0.012  -0.082  -0.019 -0.053  -0.029  -0.010 
 (0.050)  (0.034)  (0.086)  (0.068)  (0.218) (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.102) 
Single  -0.024  0.066  -0.023 -0.287*** -0.030  -0.092* -0.029  0.003 
 (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.111)  (0.102)  (0.246) (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.127) 
Primary  -0.101  -0.001 -0.198* -0.279*** -0.607* -0.143** -0.080  -0.304* 
 (0.106)  (0.064)  (0.098)  (0.097)  (0.307) (0.060)  (0.052)  (0.158) 
Secondary  -0.089 -0.062 -0.107 -0.203** -0.401 -0.112**  -0.074*  -0.212 
 (0.084)  (0.048)  (0.067)  (0.083)  (0.254) (0.044)  (0.042)  (0.131) 
Unemployed 0.044  -0.062  -0.114  -0.110  -0.758*  0.037  -0.121**  -0.382* 
 (0.089)  (0.088)  (0.148)  (0.109)  (0.390) (0.097)  (0.057)  (0.195) 
Out of labor force  -0.044  -0.027  0.084  -0.040  -0.039  0.019  0.002  -0.029 
 (0.058)  (0.045)  (0.077)  (0.050)  (0.188) (0.040)  (0.027)  (0.096) 
Big  city  0.027 -0.020 0.008  -0.015  0.132  -0.036 -0.005  0.062 
 (0.055)  (0.038)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.160) (0.072)  (0.032)  (0.082) 
Small city  -0.023  0.006  -0.020  0.004  0.017  -0.030  -0.035  0.011 
 (0.059)  (0.040)  (0.045)  (0.059)  (0.142) (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.078) 
Old arrivals  0.121  0.121  0.061  0.218*  0.378  0.117  0.080**  0.201 
 (0.144)  (0.100)  (0.138)  (0.115)  (0.358) (0.094)  (0.032)  (0.186) 
Observations  1816  2035  2122 2004 1655 2203  1897 1655 
R-squared 0.18  0.19  0.18  0.16  0.22  0.19  0.20  0.22 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and region fixed effects. [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country or origin level, 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [3] Trust is the average, calculated at the country level from the World 
Value Survey, of the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted (1) or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people (0)? [4] The cheating variables are the answer to the following questions: “how often, if ever, has 
each of these things happened to you in the last five years? A bank or insurance company failed to offer you the best deal you were 
entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty; you were sold food that was packed to conceal the 
worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you or did unnecessary work” The answer could take 
values Never (1), once (2), twice (3), 3 or 4 time (4) 5 times or more (5). [5] Old arrivals are first generation immigrants arrived in the 
country more than 20 years ago; new arrivals are first generation immigrants arrived in the country up to 20 years ago. 
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Table 9 
The effect of own trustworthiness on trust beliefs  
A. OLS estimates of expected trustworthiness on own initial trustworthiness 










        
Initial own trustworthiness 0.744***  0.542***  0.475***  0.452*** 
 (0.0419)  (0.0652)  (0.0748)  (0.0766) 
Constant  0.0848*** 0.106*** 0.0763*** 0.0653** 
 (0.0161)  (0.0232)  (0.0264)  (0.0246) 
Observations 276  208  171  171 
R-squared  0.586 0.312 0.261 0.249 
 



















   55
C. IV estimates of expected trustworthiness on initial trustworthiness instrumented with good values 










Initial own trustworthiness  0.992***  0.951***  0.751**  0.286 
  (0.261) (0.318) (0.328) (0.371) 
Constant 0.0111  -0.0130  -0.0105  0.113 
  (0.0803) (0.0961) (0.0987)  (0.115) 
Observations 249  188  153  153 
R-squared  0.510 0.120 0.078 0.184 
 
 
D. OLS estimates of expected trustworthiness on good values 










Good Values  0.122**  0.125*  0.122*  0.0515 
 (0.0588)  (0.0662)  (0.0725)  (0.0824) 
Constant  0.246*** 0.197*** 0.143*** 0.171*** 
 (0.0376)  (0.0434)  (0.0448)  (0.0531) 
Observations  339 262 216 216 
R-squared  0.025 0.027 0.027 0.004 
Notes: [1] For each regression, robust standard errors clustered at the subject-level are reported in parentheses,   *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.  [2] The numbers of observations falls in later rounds because some sessions, because of time constraints, contained fewer than 12 rounds.  [3] 
Initial  own trustworthiness is the average proportion of money invested that a subject would return---averaged over each possible amount an investor could invest 
(since the strategy method was used)---measured the first time the subject was assigned the role of entrepreneur.  To minimize contamination of this measure of 
trustworthiness by learning, while still maintaining a reasonable number of observations, all regressions using this measure only include subjects who were an 
entrepreneur for the first time in one of the first two rounds. [4] Good Values is the average of two measures obtained from a survey that subjects were asked to 
complete either one week after or one week before their experiment session occured: i) the emphasis, on a acale from 0 to 10, that the subject’s placed on being a 
model citizen as a value during their upbringing; and, ii) on the same scale, the emphasis their parents placed on group loyalty. [5] Expected Trustworthiness is the 
average proportion each subject expected entrepreneurs to return within a particular round. Beliefs were elicited in an incentive-compatible manner for each 
possible investment level; the variable used is the average of these beliefs over each possible investment level for each subject. Beliefs were elicited regardless of 
the role the subject played in a particular round; if the subject was currently an entrepreneur, they were instructed to exclude their own action from the 
calculation, and remunerated on this basis as well.     56
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Figure 2  









1-p  0 
1- π  
Y 
E 
1   58
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
Heterogeneity in trust beliefs and own trustworthiness  
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Figure 9 



























Belief Error Category (0 = underestimate; 1 = correct estimate; 2 = overestimate)
 